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The talk about the Thirteenth Amendment is
too silly for any practical lawyer's use.
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INTRODUCTION
Slavery in America is typically imagined as a peculiar but
extinguished institution, situated in a particular time and place. Our
vision of the institution is instinctively framed by images of the vast
Southern plantation, auctioneer's block, shackle, stockade and lash-
all of which were vanquished following a violent Civil War and by a
simple, textual commitment in the Constitution's Thirteenth
Amendment: "[N]either slavery nor involuntary servitude.., shall
exist in the United States."2  Slavery, however, was not forever
extinguished. In fact, it has reemerged in this country.
Every year, hundreds of thousands of humans, primarily women
and children, are being bought and sold and transported from poor to
rich countries, including the United States, as if they were simply an
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
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underground commodity.3  Widespread coverage recently has
documented that many thousands of these persons brought to this
country are coerced to work exhausting hours as domestic servants,
sex trade workers or sweatshop laborers. Most toil in dehumanizing
conditions with little or no pay.4 Their lives are subject to complete
control by their "bosses"; their passports are taken upon arrival, they
are physically isolated and abused and are otherwise denied the basic
freedoms essential to their personhood.5 The conditions of their
servitude thus often resemble core elements of antebellum slavery.
These modern victims of slavery currently have no generally
recognized Thirteenth Amendment remedy for what are
quintessential violations of the Thirteenth Amendment right to be
free from enslavement or involuntary servitude. In civil cases, victims
can rely only on the New Deal-era Fair Labor Standards Act6
("FLSA") or peripheral state common-law torts,7 all of which only
target the incidental effects of involuntary servitude. This remedial
gap is in part a consequence of the underdevelopment of Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence reflected in the dismissive comments of
even such a prominent progressive constitutional scholar as Felix
Frankfurter. Frankfurter's view that the Amendment is ineffectual in
the service of civil rights can be traced to the Supreme Court's earliest
and simplified doctrinal treatment of it.
In Reconstruction-era cases such as the Slaughter-House Cases8 and
the Civil Rights Cases,9 the Court reduced the Thirteenth
Amendment's significance to little more than a permanent guarantee
of emancipation for former slaves. The Court further suggested that
the Amendment grants no affirmative rights and was a comparatively
inconsequential precursor to the guarantees enshrined in the
Fourteenth Amendment." The Court thereafter avoided important
opportunities to explicate the full meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment."
In this article I develop a different conception of the Amendment's
meaning and its usefulness for "practical lawyers." The enactors of
the Thirteenth Amendment, radicalized by the Civil War, intended
the Amendment to do far more than permanently emancipate four
million men. The Amendment was to restore the nation to the
original natural rights ideals embodied in the Declaration of
3. See infra text accompanying notes 52-90.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 72-89.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 77-87.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 206-19 (2000).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 317-24.
8. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
9. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 111-20, 132-43.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 239-85.
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Independence 2 and complete the "final step" toward full freedom,
which guaranteed former slaves and free blacks, as well as whites, the
equal enjoyment of all the fundamental rights of national citizenship. 3
In addition, by prohibiting coercive private labor agreements, the
enactors believed the Amendment would help to usher in a distinctive
libertarian vision for society that promoted economic independence
and social mobility.14
The disconnect between the Supreme Court's hollow reading of the
Thirteenth Amendment and its broad original intent and promise is a
significant historical development that has received relatively little
scholarly attention. There has been a tendency to submerge the
Thirteenth Amendment's story into broader narratives about the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Reconstruction era. 5 The Supreme
Court's now-conventional view of the Amendment has also
diminished the possibilities that the Amendment affords courts,
legislatures and lawyers to combat civil rights violations and severe
forms of labor exploitation. Exploring the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment, therefore, is not merely a means to engage in a
historically interesting re-imagining of the Reconstruction Era under
the constitutional regime that was intended to govern. Instead, the
Thirteenth Amendment, once unshackled, stands alongside the
Fourteenth Amendment to address civil rights problems in the United
States today.
This article proposes that modern victims of slavery and involuntary
servitude be authorized to sue private parties directly under the
Thirteenth Amendment for damages pursuant to the remedial
principles set forth in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. 6 This
solution will provide victims with a remedy more appropriate to the
nature and seriousness of the harms they individually suffer and will
help vindicate the collective, normative commitments expressed by
the Thirteenth Amendment. More broadly, I hope to encourage
courts, legislators and commentators to think expansively about the
Amendment's values as they consider the increasing numbers of
forced labor cases appearing in this country. To do this, we must
appreciate the moral fervor that motivated its drafters, consider the
modern possibilities for the particular vision of a free and egalitarian
society its proponents attempted to realize, and thereby recognize the
substantial promise this forgotten Amendment holds for supporting a
broader civil rights agenda.
In Part I of this article, I describe the problem of modern slavery in
the United States. After offering several narrative accounts from
12. See infra text accompanying notes 181-85.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 186-214.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 215-24.
15. See infra note 104.
16. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
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victims that are emblematic of the brutally demeaning and coercive
conditions they endure, I demonstrate that the exploding
phenomenon of slave trafficking, which transports up to 50,000
persons a year into the United States, essentially reduces humans into
commodities. I describe the dehumanizing conditions of victims'
servitude as well as the total dominion exercised over them by their
"bosses." I suggest that this growing phenomenon resembles
antebellum chattel slavery and its direct descendant, post
Reconstruction-era peonage.
In Part II, I explore the rich interpretive possibilities offered by the
Thirteenth Amendment against the background of the impoverished
interpretations the Supreme Court has actually employed. I first
examine the narrative of slavery presented by the Supreme Court in
the Slaughter-House Cases and Civil Rights Cases in order to
demonstrate that the Court submerged the story of the Thirteenth
Amendment under a broader Fourteenth Amendment discussion and
relegated the Thirteenth Amendment to the narrow goal of
emancipation. The Court thereby made the Amendment insignificant
to the larger Reconstruction project of equality and civil rights.
With that narrow and now-conventional conception of the
Thirteenth Amendment in place, I look back, past these cases, to the
Thirteenth Amendment ratification debates themselves. The debates
reveal that the Amendment's Republican enactors developed a far
broader critique of slavery than the Reconstruction-era Supreme
Court. As a consequence, they believed the Thirteenth Amendment,
and the 1866 Civil Rights Act i" passed pursuant to its authority, would
reclaim the corrupted promise of the Declaration of Independence
and guarantee all persons-former slaves, free blacks, and whites-
the equal enjoyment of the fundamental rights of national
citizenship. 8 They also hoped that the elimination of all of slavery's
evils would promote their distinctive "free labor" vision throughout
the country, a vision in which people could enjoy the "fruits of their
own labor," become economically independent, and advance
socially. 9
I then discuss the next major opportunity the Supreme Court had to
consider the Amendment in the turn-of-the-century Peonage Cases.z"
The cases struck down certain Southern Black Codes that had for
years been keeping many blacks in perpetual labor bondage. While
the Court missed an opportunity to explicate the deep egalitarian
norms of the Thirteenth Amendment and its commitment to ending
17. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27-30.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 180-224.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 215-17.
20. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S.
219 (1911).
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racial caste systems,2 I contend that the cases nevertheless advanced a
central concern of the Thirteenth Amendment framers: protecting the
mobility of labor and meaningful opportunities for economic
independence.
I conclude Part II with a history of the early years of the Civil
Rights Section of the Justice Department ("Civil Rights Section") in
the 1.930s and 1940s in which lawyers pursued a civil rights agenda
expressly predicated on the Thirteenth Amendment's dual concerns
with labor exploitation and race. The Civil Rights Section's early
work offers a good example of how a Thirteenth Amendment
litigation strategy can be used to develop collateral themes in
complementary constitutional provisions and ultimately support a
firmer civil rights agenda. I hope to construct a framework for similar
effects today.
In Part III of this article, I return to the issue of modern slavery by
demonstrating the inadequacy of the current civil remedies that are
available for its victims. First, I demonstrate that current civil rights
statutes are not applicable to cases involving involuntary servitude
perpetrated by private actors. Second, I contend that state common
law torts address only the incidental effects of modern slavery and fail
to adequately redress the full harm caused by perpetrators. Third, I
argue that continued reliance on the most prominently used remedy in
modern slavery cases, the Fair Labor Standards Act, perpetuates an
unnecessary trend in modern civil rights law: the grounding of civil
rights and human rights laws in the Commerce Clause rather than in
the Reconstruction-era Amendments that are explicitly devoted to
advancing civil and human rights.
Then, developing the "expressive law" model proposed by Richard
Pildes and others,22 I argue that none of these options adequately
remedy the precise harm suffered in cases of modern slavery. I
contend that an adequate remedy must do more than merely
materially compensate a plaintiff. It must also express an appropriate
level of moral condemnation of the activity and vindicate the
collectively shared normative values contained in the Thirteenth
Amendment to end extreme labor exploitation and arrangements that
perpetuate perceived caste status.
Finally, I argue that, unless, and until, Congress passes an adequate
statutory remedy, victims of slavery or involuntary servitude should
be able to sue under the Thirteenth Amendment directly for damages
pursuant to the logic of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.23 I
contend that criticisms of Bivens and its use against private actors in
the Thirteenth Amendment context are either misplaced or clearly
21. See infra text accompanying notes 253-85.
22. See infra notes 366-76 and accompanying text.
23. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
[Vol. 71
MODERN SLAVERY
outweighed by the benefits of allowing victims to vindicate directly
the egalitarian and libertarian concerns of the Amendment's drafters,
concerns that have so far been undervalued by the courts. I conclude
by suggesting that reinvigorating the Thirteenth Amendment in its
core application-involuntary servitude-may encourage courts,
legislators and commentators to consider the possibilities the
Amendment holds to support a broader civil rights agenda related to
race and labor exploitation.
I. COMMODIFICATION OF HUMANS: SLAVE LABOR IN AMERICA
This article focuses on the problem of modern slave trafficking,
which I term "third generation slavery." First generation slavery was,
of course, antebellum chattel slavery in the United States, with its
immediately recognizable and monstrous images of the auctioneer's
block, shackle and whip. Second generation slavery or involuntary
servitude was a product of Reconstruction-era Black Codes that held
American blacks-and eventually immigrant whites-to long periods
of debt bondage, known as peonage. Peonage was chattel slavery's
direct descendant and generated nearly equally harsh images of
convict labor and an all-black chain gang. Third generation slavery
looks, at first glance, different than the earlier forms of slavery; it
unquestionably differs also in intensity, duration and venality.
Nevertheless, this form of slavery shares fundamental attributes with
its antecedents-most notably, overwhelming coercion, total
dominion over virtually all aspects of life, and horribly demeaning
conditions endured during the period of servitude. 24 Consider the
following examples.
Marjina Khalifa, a poor, illiterate woman from Bangladesh, was
persuaded by the owner of the textile factory in which she worked to
become a domestic servant in his daughter's home in Teaneck, New
Jersey." Once Marjina arrived in New Jersey, she became enslaved.
24. By suggesting that the problem of modern slavery with which I am concerned
resembles aspects of antebellum chattel slavery, I do not mean to suggest that the two
wrongs are of equal magnitude. Chattel slavery was assuredly one of the greatest
crimes in American history. Nevertheless, as such, it is a valuable frame of reference
by which we can measure other institutions-whether before or after-which share its
attributes. I do not need or intend to show that modem, third-generation slavery is as
thoroughly evil as antebellum slavery to demonstrate that it is both wrong and worthy
of redress under the Thirteenth Amendment.
25. Ms. Khalifa told her story in detail to the author during his representation of
her in a civil action and is recorded in various memoranda prepared in the course of
litigation as well as in affidavits rendered in her case (which has now settled), Khalifa
v. Sadiquila, No. 99 Civ. 4968 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 30, 1999), all of which are on file with
the author. Her story received attention from the media, producing articles that
provide additional details. See Stephanie Armour, Many Immigrant Workers Flee
Abuse Only to Fall Victim Again, USA Today, Nov. 20, 2001, at 1B; Adam Geller, No
Longer Silent: Exploitation Domestic Workers Tell Of, The Rec. (N.N.J), May 28,
2000, at Al; see also Human Rights Watch, Hidden in the Home: Abuse of Domestic
2002]
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Every day for six months, she toiled at length, usually for as many as
eighteen hours, taking care of two infant children, elderly parents,
cleaning, laundering and preparing elaborate meals for numerous
extended family and visitors. She was forced to service the variety of
demeaning demands made by household members on whim, such as
massaging or washing the feet of the house mistress, repeatedly
preparing tea until it was perfect, or shoveling snow in her cloth
slippers.26 For all this, she was paid only $695.27
The family regulated all aspects of her existence and responded to
any resistance with threats of deportation.28 Her passport was taken
from her upon arrival.2 9 She was forbidden to leave the house or
speak to anyone outside of the family or even to attend a mosque for
worship."' As Marjina explained,
I couldn't go out for even one second .... I wasn't allowed to leave
the house [alone] at all. [The family] told me that if I went outside,
the police would arrest me because I did not have my papers [with
me]. They said that without a green card, the police would arrest
me. [They said] America is bad and that it would be bad if I went
outside as a single woman, so I never went outside. I was like a bird
in a cage.31
Acquiescing to her rank in the home's enforced caste hierarchy, she
remained in the background. She was unable to eat until everyone
else had finished and was then only permitted the others' leftovers;
unable to use the bathroom in the morning until all others had
finished; and unable to sleep or even obtain any privacy until all
others had gone to bed. 2 She was forbidden from using the phone to
contact relatives at home and was denied a visit to a doctor when she
became ill.33 Any mistake or appearance of laziness brought her
severe reprimand or dehumanizing insult. As Marjina explained,
"[t]he family constantly humiliated me, made me feel ashamed of
myself, like I was less than human and that I had no purpose in life
other than to serve them."34 Marjina finally escaped the house while
Workers with Special Visas in the United States (2001) at 14, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/usadom/usadomO5Ol.pdf. [hereinafter Hidden in the
Home]. The Human Rights Watch has a policy of using only aliases and Ms. Khalifa's
story therefore appears as the story of Rokeya Akhatar in Hidden in the Home.
26. See Affidavit of Marjina Khalifa, $ 13-34, Khalifa, (No. 99 Civ. 4968) (on file
with author).
27. Id. 50-51.
28. Id. T 42.
29. Id. 12.
30. Id. 91 43.
31. Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 15.
32. Id. 35-39.
33. Id. 91 42-46.
34. Id. 91 47
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the family was away and eventually found her way to a community
organization, which has assisted her in starting a life here."
In several small towns in Mexico, a pair of brothers courted four
young women, promising them love and eventual marriage.36 In the
meantime, the women were persuaded to go to the United States to
live and work with the courters' sisters for money and a better life.37
After being smuggled across the border and transported to New
Jersey, the girls were forced by the sisters into prostitution with six to
eight men a day. They were physically prevented from leaving the
house, or from having contact with outsiders. A police raid uncovered
the prostitution ring and freed the young women.38
Elma Manliguez, a young Philippino woman, was tricked into
coming to the United States with her Malaysian employers, the
Josephs, under the pretext that she would be accompanying them on a
vacation.39 Once they arrived together in the United States the
Josephs took her passport and coerced her to continue as a domestic
servant in their home in Hollis, New York. She worked from 4 a.m.
until 10:30 p.m. seven days a week, feeding, bathing and caring for
three young children, cooking, cleaning and laundering for the entire
household, and performing outdoor chores.40  She was paid the
equivalent of six cents per hour.41 The Josephs sent all the money she
earned over the course of two years, approximately $1,050, directly to
35. See Armour, supra note 25.
36. See Ronald Smothers, Six Are Accused of Forcing Girls from Mexico into
Prostitution, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 2002, at B5.
37. Id.
38. See John P. Martin, Four Mexican Girls Say They Were Enslaved as
Prostitutes -Case Likely to be First Test of Law on Trafficking Immigrants, The Star-
Ledger (N.J.), Mar. 26, 2002, at 39. About a year prior, two Americans and a Russian
conspired to bring six Russian dancers, including two minors, to Alaska by promising
the women they would work as dancers at cultural events or Las Vegas-style showgirl
events. Visas were forged and once the girls landed, their passports and return tickets
were confiscated. The girls were forced to live in one room, and perform nude,
against their wishes, for no pay. Brief for the United States as Appellee at 3-7, United
States v. Kennard, No. 01-30346, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18193 (9th Cir. 2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/kennard.pdf; see also Robert Rudolph,
Russian Trio Called Enslavers of Women- 3 Allegedly Supplied Strip Clubs' Dancers,
The Star-Ledger (N.J.), Aug. 28, 2002 at 1 (describing federal indictment brought
against "human trafficking" ring in Brooklyn that had been smuggling Russian
women to perform in the sex industry as if they were "chattel").
39. Manliguez v. Joseph, No. 01-CV-7574, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2002); John Marzulli, Says She was a Slave: Maid Sues Qns. Exec
Over Bad Pay, Abuse, Daily News (N.Y.), Aug. 27, 2002 at 3.
40. Manliguez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *4-6.
41. Marzulli, supra note 39, at 3.
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Elma's bank account in the Philippines so that she could not access
it.42
The Josephs also physically and emotionally isolated Elma. They
denied her a key to the self-locking door and permitted her to leave
their home only if accompanied by a family member or if she stayed
within view of the house.43 They refused her permission to attend
church, forbade her any days off and denied her medication for her
illnesses." They prohibited interactions with non-family members and
permitted her only one phone call home during her two years of
service.45 In her daily interactions with the family, she endured
constant insult and humiliation and threats of violence.46 She rarely
ate more than one meal a day and was permitted only leftovers. She
was forbidden the dignity of eating at the kitchen table and was forced
to eat near the washing machine or on the floor.4 ' Elma finally
escaped on a day that the Josephs left a set of house keys behind.48
Over a period of several years in the late 1990s, approximately 250
Vietnamese and 15 Chinese men and women paid recruiters
significant brokerage sums for placement in seemingly promising
factory jobs in the U.S. protectorate of American Samoa. Housed in
factory dormitories, the laborers slept two people to a bed, received
paltry rations of food, and were subjected to a rigid curfew; the
conditions were backed by force of hired company guards. 49 They
toiled long hours under hard, regimented conditions for less than
$2.25 an hour and no overtime." In November 2000, when the
laborers protested their conditions, company guards attacked them,
causing multiple injuries.
A. The Market for Humans in the United States
These stories are merely emblematic52 of a phenomenal
transformation of international labor markets, a transformation which
42. Manliguez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *6.
43. Id. at *6-7.
44. Id.
45. Id. at *7.
46. Id. at *8.
47. Id. at *5.
48. Id. at *8.
49. Anh Do, Subsisting is Hard Work, The Orange County Reg. (Cal.), Mar. 25,
2002, available at 2002 WL 5444119; Steven Greenhouse, Apparel Maker in Samoa is
Told to Pay Workers $3.5 Million, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 2002, at A14 [hereinafter
Greenhouse, Apparel Maker]; Labor: Vietnamese Workers Have to Return from
Abroad, Vietnam News Briefs, May 28, 2002.
50. Greenhouse, Apparel Maker, supra note 49.
51. Id.
52. See Sean Gardiner & Geoffrey Mohan, Smuggled for Sex: The Sex Slaves from
[Vol. 71990
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has contributed to the conversion of many thousands of humans into
simple commodities. Although governments do not keep official
statistics on the number of persons trafficked into servitude,53 an
interagency group under the auspices of the National Security Council
conservatively estimated in 1998 that 700,000 women and children are
trafficked annually across international borders; of these,
approximately 50,000 are trafficked into the United States. 4 Persons
trafficked into the United States come most frequently from
Southeast Asia (particularly Thailand, Vietnam and China), Latin
America (particularly Mexico) and Eastern Europe (particularly
Russia, Ukraine and the Czech Republic) and are most often
discovered in New York, California and Florida. 55  The primary
markets for trafficked laborers in the U.S. are domestic service,
Mexico, Newsday (N.Y.), Mar. 12, 2001, at A5 (discussing sentences and restitution
awards ordered by a Florida court against a family ring that brought over fourteen
Mexican women to work in brothels); David Rosenzweig, Woman Gets 8 Years in
Thai Slave Case, L.A. Times, Jan. 11, 2000, at B2 (describing the conditions as
testified at trial of three female employees forced to work eighteen hours per day for
the defendant in her home and restaurant including serving guests on their knees);
Somini Sengupta, An Immigrant's Legal Enterprise; In Suing Employer, Maid Fights
Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2000, at B1 (describing a Bangladeshi
woman's domestic servitude in which she was forced to work seven day work weeks,
was prohibited from leaving the house and endured humiliating threats and physical
abuse); Sandra Tan, Labor Camp Indictments, The Buff. News, June 21, 2002, at B1
(describing conditions of a labor camp in Western New York State in which dozens of
Mexican workers received little food and the contractor deducted exorbitant amounts
for expenses from their wages).
53. The U.S. government has defined trafficking as consisting of "[aIll acts
involved in the transport, harboring, or sale of persons within national or across
international borders through coercion, force, kidnapping, deception or fraud, for
purposes of placing persons in situations of forced labor or services, such as forced
prostitution, domestic servitude, debt bondage or other slavery-like practices."
Francis T. Miko, Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S. and International
Response, Cong. Res. Service Rep. 98-649 C (May 10, 2000), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/traffic/crs510.htm. Of course, not all domestic
servants, sex trade workers and factory or garment workers, even those who are
vulnerable and come from poor nations, are placed in involuntary servitude. For that
reason, in the early part of this article I make use of the term "trafficked" labor as
shorthand to connote a difference between voluntary forms of this kind of work and
those that are coerced, involuntary and, ultimately, unconstitutional. The basis for
that difference-between consensual labor and unconstitutional labor-is developed
more thoroughly below.
54. See International Trafficking in Women and Children: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, Sen. Hrg. 106-705, 106th Cong. 11 (2000), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senatellsh106.html (statement of Frank E.
Loy, Undersecretary for Global Affairs, United States Department of State)
[hereinafter Statement of Frank E. Loy].
55. Amy O'Neill Richard, International Trafficking in Women to the United States:
A Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime, Center for the Study
of Intelligence 3, available at http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/
women/trafficking.pdf.
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sweatshops and the sex industry (prostitution, stripping, peep shows
and massage parlors that include sexual services).56
Global capitalism has organized countries into unequal participants
and expanded broad structural, hierarchical links between poor,
sending countries, and rich, receiving countries. Within this
international system, a major instrument for moving humans has been
organized criminal enterprises of various sizes and degrees of
sophistication. The human trafficking industry has become, in fact,
one of the world's most lucrative and fastest growing criminal
enterprises, generating profits second only to profits from drugs and
guns.5" These enterprises are motivated in part by the low costs
associated with the trade in humans. Humans have become "highly
profitable, low risk, expendable, reusable, and resellable
commodities."59  In other words, hundreds of thousands of these
"commodities" are sold into slavery.
Like gun and drug traffickers, slave traffickers depend on basic
forces of supply and demand for the human commodity. They find a
ready supply of vulnerable persons susceptible to exploitation, most
frequently women and children. Women are typically driven abroad
by extreme poverty in their home country, which is exacerbated by
low social status in patriarchal societies, and lack of access to
economic opportunities, credit or ownership of property." Children
56. Id.; Statement of Frank E. Loy, supra note 54, at 11 (noting that
approximately half of U.S. bound trafficked labor is in domestic service and
sweatshop labor); Samantha C. Halem, Slaves to Fashion: A Thirteenth Amendment
Litigation Strategy to Abolish Sweatshops in the Garment Industry, 36 San Diego L.
Rev. 397, 398-99 (1999) (noting "growing problem" of exploited immigrant labor in
sweatshops). Other related industries include mail order bride companies, which,
though primarily legal, bring approximately 4000 to 6000 women to the U.S. annually,
mostly from the Philippines and Newly Independent States. See Richard, supra note
55, at 27; see also Vanessa B.M. Vergara, Comment, Abusive Mail-Order Bride
Marriage and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1547, 1599 (2000)
(arguing that inherent coercive aspects of mail order bride system resemble slavery).
Another related trafficking industry involves importation of maids or servants for
6migr6 businesses in the U.S. who are then worked under exhausting, uncompensated
and abusive conditions. See Richard, supra note 55, at 27.
57. Rhacel Salazar Parrefias, Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and
Domestic Work 25 (2001) (explaining that migrant laborers are "part of the ongoing
circulation of resources, both capital and labor, within the boundaries of a single
global division of labor, that is between a dominant core and a dependent periphery"
(quoting Kathie Friedman-Kasaba, Memories of Migration: Gender, Ethnicity, and
Work in the Lives of Jewish and Italian Women in New York, 1870-1.924 24 (1996)));
see also Miko, supra note 53.
58. Statement of Frank E. Loy, supra note 54, at 11. In this industry, however,
there is no necessary correlation between size and brutality or profits. See Richard,
supra note 55, at 19-20 (describing enormous profits made by one or two-person
operations); id. at vii ("The size or structure of the criminal group, however, has no
bearing on the violence, intimidation, and brutality that is commonly perpetrated on
the trafficking victims.").
59. Richard, supra note 55, at 1; see also Parrefias, supra note 57, at 249-54.
60. See Statement of Frank E. Loy, supra note 54, at 11-12; Parrefias, supra note
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whose families pull them from school in favor of menial employment
are made more susceptible to the international market for their work,
and are sometimes even sold into the market by their own families.6
The governments of source countries have little power, and perhaps
less interest, in protecting departing nationals.62 Though the vast
majority of trafficked labor comprises foreign national women and
children, men63 and even United States citizens also fall prey.'
At the same time, increased demand in the United States for
domestic service, sweatshop labor and sex workers absorbs the great
supply of exploitable humans.65 A substantial demand for domestic
workers comes from foreign diplomats or representatives of
international organizations living in the United States, who import
women from their home countries under false promises to abide by
United States law.66 Many of the worst cases of abuse of domestic
57, at 62-65; Janie Chuang, Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking in Women:
Definitions, Paradigms and Contexts, 11 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 65, 68 (1998)
("Trafficking in women is fueled by poverty, sexism, and racism, all of which combine
to create a situation of unequal bargaining power and vulnerability."); Miko, supra
note 53, (major factor in trafficking is the "continuing subordination of women in
many societies, as reflected in economic, educational, and work opportunity
disparities between men and women"). Domestic abuse as well as physical violence,
themselves persistent aspects of gender inequality in source countries, also drives
women to migrate. Parrefias, supra note 57, at 66-68.
61. See Miko, supra note 53 ("Many societies still favor sons and view girls as an
economic burden. Desperate families in some of the most impoverished countries sell
their daughters to brothels or traffickers for the immediate payoff and to avoid having
to pay the dowry to marry off daughters."); Statement of Frank E. Loy, supra note 54,
at 12.
62. See Parrefias, supra note 57, at 48 ("[T]he denationalization of economies
compels these [developing] nations to respond to the demand for low-wage labor and
extend their range of exports to include their able-bodied workers.").
63. Christine Haughney, Suit Claims Indentured Servitude, Wash. Post, Jan. 4,
2001, at A10 (describing the suit filed by a Zambian man working for a United
Nations official and university professor claiming he worked for less than a dollar per
hour while performing household chores and caring for the family's autistic son);
Martin Mbugua, Working for Slave Wages, Daily News (N.Y.), June 10, 2001, at 13
(same); Edward Wong, Domestic Worker's Suit Seeks Pay from Ex-United Nations
Official, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 2001, at B6 (same).
64. Thomas C. Tobin, For Slavery, Man to Serve Four Years, St. Petersburg Times
(Fla.), Aug. 16, 2001, at Al (describing scheme to enslave homeless African American
men in Florida orange groves).
65. See Parrefias, supra note 57, at 71-72 (noting an increase in the demand for
domestic servants); id. at 72-76 (explaining the inequality of class, race, gender and
citizenship as essential to the dynamic of exploited domestic help); Miko, supra note
53 (noting increased demand for sex workers, domestic servants and sweatshop
labor); see also Melanie Ryan, Swept Under the Carpet: Lack of Legal Protections for
Household Workers-A Call for Justice, 20 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 159, 160-63 (1999)
(describing the transformation of the composition of domestic workers from African
American women to immigrant women and noting the continuity of power imbalance
regardless).
66. See Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 7 (describing ease with which
foreign nationals can subvert visa requirements for bringing domestic servants into
the United States); Richard, supra note 55, at 28 (noting that 3800 domestic servants
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workers involve these foreign officials or businessmen who typically
prefer to hire from their own countries, suggesting that these foreign
nationals are attempting to import to the United States their own
society's caste systems or hierarchical social relationships.6 7
Trafficked women and children are initially vulnerable to such
abuse due to their own desperation, isolation or ignorance. When
they "consent" to domestic service or other labor arrangements, it is
based on deceit or coercion. Their vulnerabilities are exacerbated by
their circumstances once they arrive in the United States. Most are
culturally isolated, unable to speak English, unfamiliar with American
laws and customs, and unable to communicate with outsiders, let
alone friends and family.6" Women forced into the sex industry may
feel ashamed or guilty about their conduct and terrified about the
consequences. 69 Domestic workers often feel trapped by employers
come to the U.S. each year to work for foreign diplomats or non-U.S. staff members
of international organizations).
67. See Armour, supra note 25 (describing obstacles to collecting back wage and
damage awards after the employer returns to his home country leaving the employee
with nothing); William Branigin, A Life of Exhaustion, Beatings and Isolation, Wash.
Post, Jan. 5, 1999, at A6 [hereinafter Branigin, Life of Exhaustion] (describing slave-
like conditions endured by Ethiopian woman in D.C. home of Ethiopian former staff
member of IMF, including thousands of hours of work for an average of three cents
an hour, being forbidden to leave the house, attend church, or receive medical
assistance, and being made to endure physical abuse); William Branigin, Safeguards
Proposed for Servants, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 2000, at B4 [hereinafter Branigin,
Safeguards] (describing slave-like conditions endured by Bolivian woman working in
Washington, D.C. for an official from Organization of American States, which
included having passport confiscated and being forbidden from leaving, working
twelve hours a day for sixteen months for less than a dollar an hour, and rape by a
family friend, which officials ignored); Steven Greenhouse, Embassies Enslaving
Foreign Women, Pitt. Post-Gazette, June 17, 2001, at A10 (same) [hereinafter
Greenhouse, Embassies Enslaving Foreign Women]; Chisun Lee, Trouble on the
Home Front, Village Voice (N.Y.), Jul. 17, 2001, at 21 (describing conditions endured
by Indian domestic servant in New York City apartment of prominent Indian
businessman and woman); James Ridgeway, UNslaves, Village Voice (N.Y.), Mar. 10,
1998, at 57 (describing slave-like conditions endured by Senegalese domestic servant
in New York City home of head of African section of UN Population Office);
Sengupta, supra note 52, at B1 (describing the conditions endured by a domestic
servant used by a Bahraini diplomat). See generally Hidden in the Home, supra note
25, at 7-19 (documenting dozens of cases of physical, psychological, and emotional
abuse of domestic servants by foreign diplomats and officials of international
organizations).
68. Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 4; Rudolph, supra note 38, at Al(describing threats made against Russian women forced to work in the sex industry,
including threats of retribution against families at home and threats of murder). A
trafficking victim explained:
We all suffer the same mistreatment. We come with illusions that they will
pay a lot here. They offer us many things. They bring us here deceived....
They bring women who don't know anything about American laws. The
only thing left for these women is to continue being abused. They don't
know where to go.
Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 4 (omission in original).
69. See Chuang, supra note 60, at 69 ("Traffickers... can more easily subjugate
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who convey to them that communication with outsiders or even
leaving the home means danger, death or deportation,7" or because
they are desperate to avoid losing an even minimal amount of income
to help families in their home countries.71 Because of their immense
vulnerability, typical victims are often barely able to resist the
conditions of their labor.
B. Slavery-like Conditions
Once trafficked persons come to the United States to work, the
process of transforming their humanity into a commercial product
continues. It is a process that harkens to critical aspects of antebellum
chattel slavery. Most obviously, workers are required to toil
exhausting hours, without time off or medical care, performing all
household chores, taking care of children and, in the case of sex
trade workers, performing sexual services.73 A more fundamental
ingredient of antebellum slavery that these modern individuals share
is that the "master" has the power to deny those facets of life that
constitute essential attributes of personhood and thereby transform
persons into little more than property. Professor Akhil Amar has
suggested that the critical attribute of slavery is "[a] power relation of
domination, degradation, and subservience, in which human beings
are treated as chattel, not persons"74 This "totalistic relationship"75
foreign women due to their inability to speak the language of the country in which
they reside ... and their fear of deportation to their native communities where they
might be treated as criminals for having engaged in prostitution.").
70. Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 13-14 (describing "employers' methods
of striking fear into workers with stories of the dangers in the streets and the brutality
of the police).
71. See, e.g., id., supra note 25, at 9-10.
I come from a poor family. My mother is a single mother. We don't have
anything... Sometimes one is pressured by the economic situation. It's
terrible what one suffers... Sometimes I ask myself why I put up with so
much. It's for this, for my mother and my daughters.
Id. (quoting Guatemalan domestic servant about why she continued to endure pain
and humiliation of her involuntary servitude) (omission in original).
72. See Affidavit of Marjina Khalifa, supra note 26, 16, (stating that she worked
eighteen-hour days for six months); Branigin, Safeguards, supra note 67, (noting that
a Bolivian servant worked twelve hours a day for sixteen months, through untreated
illnesses, at the approximate wage of one dollar per hour); Hidden in the Home, supra
note 25, at 8 (describing a Guatemalan domestic servant who worked a minimum of
twelve hours per day for seven days a week); Sengupta, supra note 52 (describing a
Bangladeshi servant who worked fourteen hours per day, seven days a week for
approximately $100 per month).
73. See Gardiner & Mohan, supra note 52 (noting that women were forced to
have sex with up to thirty men a day, six days a week); Martin, supra note 38,
(describing circumstances of young girls who were forced to work seven days a week
performing "tricks").
74. See Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1365, 1384
(1992) (explaining that slavery also includes "the reduction of humans beings to the
status of things").
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between master and slave was established by force and reinforced by
the masters' belief in the natural inferiority of the slave and their
servile place in the world.76 These ingredients are also present in the
forms of modern slavery in the United States.
In modern cases of slavery or involuntary servitude, bosses destroy
laborers' control over their personhood 7 Passports are taken upon
entry to the United States." Laborers are told that the alternative to
their servitude is deportation, abuse by the police, or the violence of
the American street.79 Workers are intentionally isolated, forbidden
from exploring their new environment, communicating with outsiders
or their own family, and are sometimes physically bound."' As a
United Nations official explained: "Women's movement is either
overtly impeded through locks, bars and chains or less conspicuously
(but no less effectively) restricted by confiscation of their passports
and travel documents, stories of arrest and deportation, [or] threats of
retaliation against family members . . . ." Essential aspects of a
laborer's humanity is also destroyed. They are frequently denied the
75. Mark V. Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery: 1810-1860 33 (1981).
76. See Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum
South 145 (1956); Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor. Battered Women,
Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 Yale J.L. & Feminism 207,
219 (1992) (describing that slaveholders' "belief in their moral right of ownership, in
their natural superiority, and in the African Americans' natural inferiority provided
the justification for daily degradation and subjugation"). Kenneth Stampp explained
that the key step in maintaining slaves was
to implant in the bondsmen themselves a consciousness of personal
inferiority. They had 'to know and keep their places,' to 'feel the difference
between master and slave,' to understand that bondage was their natural
status. They had to feel that African ancestry tainted them, that their color
was a badge of degradation.
Stampp, supra, at 145; see also David B. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western
Culture 58 (1966). See generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color:
the Colonial Period (1978).
77. See generally Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 12-15.
78. See generally id. at 13; United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 999 (1st Cir.
1995); Manliguez v. Joseph, No. 01-CV-7574, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at * 2-3,
11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2002); Richard, supra note 55, at 5; see also Affidavit of
Marjina Khalifa, supra note 26, 12; Greenhouse, Embassies Enslaving Foreign
Women, supra note 67.
79. See Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 14-15; see also Richard, supra note
55, at 5; Alzanki, 54 F. 3d at 999.
80. See Manliguez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *6-8; David France, Slavery's
New Face, Newsweek (N.Y.), Dec. 18, 2000, at 60; Annie Gowen, Woman Says
Maryland Couple Enslaved, Beat Her, Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 2001, at B2. See generally
Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 14-15.
81. Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective:
Violence Against Women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, on Trafficking
in Women, Women's Migration and Violence Against Women Submitted in
Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/44, U.N. ESCOR,
Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., at 39, U.N. doc. E/CN.4/2000/68, (2000)
available at http://www.decemberl8.net/unchrreports2000.htm.
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opportunity to worship according to their faith.82  They are
intentionally cut off from contact with their families in their home
countries.83 Laborers' private lives are frequently co-opted by a boss's
assertion of total control.8 4 Servants are often also denied medical
treatment, perhaps reflecting a conclusion that such an investment is
simply not worth the cost." Physical, sexual and psychological abuse
is common,86 operating consciously or unconsciously to keep a woman
worker "in her place."8
These forms of abuse create a system of complete domination
hidden inside the home or the factory.8 As the court noted of the
82. See Manliguez, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *7 (noting the refusal of masters to
allow Manliguez to attend church); Affidavit of Marjina Khalifa, supra note 26, T 43
(describing the assertions of masters that there were no mosques in America).
83. See Manliguez, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *7 (describing the masters' success
in hiding mail from Manliguez and permitting Manliguez to call home no more than
once in two years); Hidden in the Home supra note 25, at 14 (describing the variety of
limitations placed on ability of servants to contact family members).
84. See Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 18 (describing the means of
invading privacy such as reading mail, listening to phone conversations, searching
rooms or purses as an aspect of demeaning and controlling workers); see also
Affidavit of Marjina Khalifa, supra note 26, IT 35, 40 (describing the lack of privacy,
forced isolation and prohibition on using telephone).
85. See Manliguez, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *6 (describing the denial of
medication for various illnesses and explaining the requirement that Manliguez
continue working while sick); Branigin, Safeguards, supra note 67, (noting that a
worker did not receive medical treatment after allegedly being raped by her
employer's friend); Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 16 (noting that in the three
cases reviewed, the employer denied medical treatment to the worker and required
them to continue their service); Ridgeway, supra note 67 (noting that a worker was
left with a medical debt of $11,000 despite the fact that the employer promised to
procure medical insurance for the worker).
86. Trafficking of Women and Children in the International Sex Trade: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and Human Rights of the House Comm. On
Int'l Relations, 106th Cong. 75 (1999) (statement of Theresa Loar, Director, Office of
the Senior Coordinator for International Women's Issues).
87. United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 999 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Branigin, A
Life of Exhaustion, supra note 67 (explaining a domestic servant's inability to leave
the house or to attend church, and describing the beatings she endured when she cried
or complained); Greenhouse, Embassies Enslaving Foreign Women, supra note 67
(stating that after a domestic servant was raped by a family friend her employer
refused to acknowledge the possibility of a crime and failed to take the servant for
medical assistance); Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 10 (quoting a domestic
servant who explained that the climate of fear and abuse imposed by her bosses
"made [her] feel inhuman").
88. See Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 18 (interview with Ai-jen Poo,
Program Director, Women Workers Project, Committee *Against Anti-Asian
Violence (Mar. 6, 2000) regarding trafficked domestic servants). As Ai-jen Poo,
stated,
There's a lot of psychological warfare that goes on in the workplace. It's a
really strange industry because the workers' ... jobs are to raise children and
care for intimate elements of people's lives. [There is] an emotional and
psychological element to work that does not exist in any other industry, so
the abuse [the women workers] face is very different [and] very similar to
domestic violence-those power dynamics .... That ... kind of control is
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
conditions of Elma Manliguez' servitude, they represent "acts of
barbarism and unrelenting mental brutality reminiscent of the gulag
memorialized by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his novel entitled One
Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich."9
The denial of basic personal freedom and subjugation is a severe
degradation that therefore deserves a legal remedy more substantial
than mere repayment of back wages. As explained below," these
wrongs should be remedied through the development of the provision
that, though fallen into relative disuse since Reconstruction,
represents the most compelling constitutional condemnation of labor
and caste exploitation-the Thirteenth Amendment.
II. THE INTERPRETABLE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Thirteenth Amendment succinctly states,
Section 1: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction.
Section 2: Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.9'
In its first attempt to evaluate the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court referred to it as a "grand yet simple
declaration" 9 2-a strong, but ultimately damning praise. The Court
has never departed from the substance of its early, lofty
dismissiveness. In particular, it has never struggled with the
implications of the constitutional abolition of an institution that had
been sown deeply in American soil for over 300 years and that
ultimately tore the country apart. 3 Even in the modern era, the Court
has balked at a substantive evaluation of the Amendment, cavalierly
dismissing it as "simple" or a "skimpy collection of words"94 and
rejecting any suggestion that it grants positive rights.95
difficult to write about or document or create laws around, [but it is] such a
key element of control and [of] how power operates.
Id.; see also id. at 10; supra note 87.
89. Manliguez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *15.
90. See infra Part II.B.
91. U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
92. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,39 (1873).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 102-48.
94. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226, 227 (1971); see also General Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390 n. 17 (1982) ("We need not
decide whether the Thirteenth Amendment itself... accomplished anything more
than the abolition of slavery."); Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124 (1981).
95. See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 1,28 (1995) (noting that in its first hundred years, scholars acquiesced to
the Supreme Court's view that the Thirteenth Amendment grants no affirmative
rights).
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Scholars, by contrast, have recently begun to pay greater attention
to the Thirteenth Amendment's remedial possibilities, suggesting that
the prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude in section 1 can be
employed to combat aspects of child abuse,96 domestic violence,9
abortion restrictions,98 and corporate use of foreign slave labor.99 I
endorse these projects and similarly propose that the Thirteenth
Amendment should be used to attack the problem of modern slavery
in the United States. I am concerned to the extent that some of this
scholarship depends in part upon strained interpretations of basically
flawed Reconstruction-era Supreme Court cases, rather than a fresh
reading of the Amendment itself.l 0
I propose that scholars should look also to the ratification debates
surrounding the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment and of the
1866 Civil Rights Act passed pursuant to its authority as a rich source
for civil rights protections. Those debates reveal that the Thirteenth
Amendment was meant to do far more than free four million slaves
from bondage or guarantee workers the right to quit their jobs.
Rather, the Amendment was heroically championed as the "final
step" towards "full freedom" in the country for former slaves, free
blacks and white laborers,' 0 ' and as a permanent guarantee of equality
96. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 74.
97. See McConnell, supra note 76.
98. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor. A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of
Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 480 (1990).
99. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the
Global Economy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 973 (2002); see also Larry J. Pittman, Physician-
Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The Intersection of the Thirteenth Amendment and
Health Care Treatments Having Disproportionate Impacts on Disfavored Groups, 28
Seton Hall L. Rev. 774, 869 (1998) (arguing that a direct cause of action should exist
under the Thirteenth Amendment for disparate health care treatment received by
blacks as a "badge or incident of slavery"); Neal Kumar Katyal, Note, Men Who Own
Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced Prostitution, 103 Yale L.J. 791,
817-20 (1993) (arguing that women forced into prostitution or abused by their pimps
should be able to sue municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to enforce
Thirteenth Amendment prohibitions on such coercive arrangements); Vergara, supra
note 56 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits abusive mail-order bride
arrangements).
100. For example, Professor Amar relies on the Slaughter-House Cases to support
his claim that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits "any... kind of slavery," see
Amar & Widawsky supra note 74, at 1368, but he does not account for the cases'
disregard for the many attendant evils associated with the slavery the Thirteenth
Amendment meant to extinguish. See infra text accompanying notes 102-48.
Professor McConnell claims that "Congress, however, chose to limit the scope of the
[Thirteenth] Amendment," to solve only those problems akin to African slavery, see
McConnell, supra note 76, at 217, but does not address the broad egalitarian and free
labor principles the Amendment's framers hoped to install. See infra Part II.B.2. But
see Pamela D. Bridgewater, Un/Re/Dis Covering Slave Breeding in Thirteenth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 7 Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J. 11, 19, 40 (2001)
(noting that under the Slaughter-House decision, "slavery is so narrowly constructed
that it made adding conditions of slavery, based on changing views of the ways in
which slavery impacted all participants, nearly impossible").
101. See infra Part II.B.
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in the enjoyment of all the fundamental civil rights of citizenship in a
republic. These debates and the significant interpretive potential they
offer provide a firm, true foundation for understanding the Thirteenth
Amendment and construing a civil rights agenda based upon it.
A. Damning with Great Praise: Early Judicial Constriction of the
Thirteenth Amendment
Separated by ten years, the two most famous Reconstruction-era
cases, the Slaughter-House Cases"12 and the Civil Rights Cases,1"
operated as a judicial vise that squeezed the Thirteenth Amendment
into a doctrinal sliver. It is useful to start the story of the Thirteenth
Amendment with the cases that relegated it to the role of ajurisprudentially inconsequential precursor to the Fourteenth
Amendment, and then look backwards to the Amendment's
ratification debates. This perspective will highlight the significant
interpretive potential of the Amendment that these cases ignored-a
potential that has consequently been winnowed from constitutionallaw." 4
With apparent eagerness, the Court first considered the meaning of
the Thirteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases."5 At issue
102. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
103. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
104. While the Supreme Court marginalized the Thirteenth Amendment's
significance in the short years after its passage, the Amendment also, possibly as a
result of the Court's treatment, receives comparatively little attention in the law
school curriculum or among constitutional scholars. See Colbert, supra note 95, at 3-5
(1995) (criticizing lack of attention devoted to Thirteenth Amendment in law
schools). Derrick Bell and Sanford Levinson have expressed considerable frustration
towards the absence of meaningful discussion of slavery's effect on the Constitution's
development. See Derrick Bell, Learning the Three 'l's of America's Slave Heritage, 68
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1037, 1040-41 (1993) (criticizing "constitutional apologists" who
"see little present significance in the fact that the Framers of this country's
Constitution saw fit to recognize slavery"); Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of
Constitutional Law, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1087, 1090 (1993) (arguing that the current
constitutional canon, as developed by casebooks, neglects the fact that slavery and
"its implications pervaded every single aspect of constitutional law (and constitutional
interpretation)"). This article supports the general projects of Professors Bell and
Levinson by demonstrating how multi-faceted Republican critiques of slavery
dominated the enacting Congress's understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment's
purpose.
105. The Court was actually presented with a question related to the Thirteenth
Amendment two years earlier, in Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (16 Wall.) 581 (1871),
but sidestepped a substantive review of the Amendment's meaning. After being
convicted in federal court of brutally beating three blacks, the white defendants in
Blyew challenged the constitutionality of the federal removal provision of the 1866
Civil Rights Act, which had been passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. Id.
at 584. Over strong dissents by Justices Bradley and Swayne, the Supreme Court
avoided passing on the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act and reversed the
convictions on a technical statutory interpretation of the limited grounds for federal
removal. Id. at 594; see also id. at 595 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (expressly supporting
constitutionality of the Act and chastising the majority for emphasizing statutory
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was a Louisiana statute that had given monopolies to slaughter-houses
operating in various parishes in the state.'016 The petitioners advanced
several constitutional theories to invalidate the monopoly law,
including that it created an "involuntary servitude" upon the property
of competitor slaughter-houses in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment;1' 7 that it denied those slaughter-houses the essential
"privileges and immunities" of fulfilling a livelihood protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment;08 and that, by blatantly discriminating
against their economic interests, the law denied them their Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of "equal protection of the laws." 109  The
Slaughter-House Cases were obviously vital to the doctrinal
development of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly in its narrow
construction of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. That aspect of
the Court's opinion has received voluminous academic attention."0
The Court's relegation of the Thirteenth Amendment to a limited
doctrinal significance has received comparatively little attention."'
technicalities over the Act's clear intention to carry out the Thirteenth Amendment's
intentions to "abolish[] slavery in the United States, and to place persons of African
descent on an equality of rights and privileges with other citizens of the United
States").
106. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 56.
107. Id. at 50-51.
108. Id. at 53-55.
109. Id. at 56.
110. See, e.g., Edward Corwin, The Constitution of the United States of America
(1953); Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights (1986); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980); Robert
J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts,
Department of Justice and Civil Rights, 1866-1876 (1985); Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2
Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949).
111. Few legal scholars have offered a detailed analysis of the ratification debates
surrounding the adoption of Thirteenth Amendment, apart from a study of the
broader vision of the Reconstruction Congress as a whole. In 1951, Professor Jacobus
tenBroek offered the first and still classic account in which he emphasizes the natural
rights philosophy of the Republican enactors. Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and
Key to Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Cal. L. Rev. 171 (1951) [hereinafter tenBroek,
Thirteenth Amendment]. Almost forty years later, Professor Lea VanderVelde
surveyed the arguments of the more radical Republicans for a broad "labor vision" of
the Amendment that emphasized autonomy for workers in late nineteenth-century
America. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138
U. Pa. L. Rev. 437 (1989). At about the same time, Professor Robert Kaczorowski
offered a study of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, in
Congress and in the press, as well as the early enforcement of those provisions to
demonstrate the Reconstruction Congress's clear intent to revolutionize federalism by
transferring the power over enforcement of civil rights to the national government.
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War
and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863 (1986) [hereinafter Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism]. These studies do not emphasize the role that larger
slavery critiques had upon the ratification debates or place the Thirteenth
Amendment framers' intentions in the context of the judicial opinions that soon after
distorted them.
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Justice Miller opened his majority opinion by narrating the then-
recent history of the Civil War, which was "fresh within the memory
of us all.' 1 12 He characterized the slavery controversy at the heart of
the Civil War as essentially a contest over the right of slave states to
secede and resist federal authority:
The institution of African slavery, as it existed in about half the
States of the Union, and the contests pervading the public mind for
many years, between those who desired its curtailment and ultimate
extinction and those who desired additional safeguards for its
security and perpetuation, culminated in the effort, on the part of
most of the States in which slavery existed, to separate from the
Federal government, and to resist its authority. This constituted the
war of the rebellion ....
Within that simply conceived struggle, "slavery, as a legalized social
relation, perished. It perished as a necessity of the bitterness and
force of the conflict. 114 Justice Miller's narrow understanding of the
troubles caused by slavery may have been prevalent at the outbreak of
war in 1861."1 By the time of the adoption of the Thirteenth
Many prominent scholars have studied the Congressional debates over the
Reconstruction Amendments generally, but have clearly prioritized the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment and have not studied the Amendment as an independent
historical event. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction (1998); Howard Jay Graham, The Early Anti Slavery Backgrounds of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 479. A recent work has examined how
competing versions of the Fourteenth Amendment won out as the historically
authoritative account; this work has been a helpful model in my attempt to discern the
authoritative meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Pamela Brandwein,
Reconstructing Reconstruction: The Supreme Court and the Production of Historical
Truth (1999).
Historians have, of course, provided enormously thorough descriptions of the
institution of antebellum slavery and the life of slaves before and after emancipation.
See, e.g., Eugene D. Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made (1974);
Peter Kolchin, American Slavery 1619-1877 (1993); Leon F. Litwack, Been in the
Storm so Long: The Aftermath Of Slavery (1979); Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar
Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South (1956). Historians, particularly Eric
Foner, have also produced enormously revealing accounts of the Republican ideology
and the Reconstruction Era. See Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The
Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (1970) [hereinafter Foner,
Free Soil]; Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877
(1988) [hereinafter Foner, Reconstruction]; see also James M. McPherson, The
Struggle For Equality: Abolitionists and the Negro in the Civil War and
Reconstruction (1964); Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction: 1865-1877
(1965). These historical accounts, however, do not focus on the Thirteenth
Amendment as a legal text, nor do they purport to address the original intentions of
the Thirteenth Amendment ratifiers.
112. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 68.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. In 1861, the War's aims were expressly limited to preventing expansion of
slavery into free territories (free soil) because Northern Democrats were primarily
upset about increasing federal government involvement in the enforcement of the
Fugitive Slave Act. Most Republicans believed that slavery had to grow to survive; if
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Amendment in 1865 and the passage Civil Rights Act of 1866,
however, proponents of those enactments incorporated the trauma of
war and experiences with Southern recalcitrance after the Northern
victory into far more complex narratives about the slave system they
sought to destroy."16
Miller thus suppressed the numerous dangers of slavery that its
ratifiers had believed the Thirteenth Amendment would eradicate."7
Nevertheless, Miller continued with his diluted history by explaining
that once the War ended, the victors needed to record in permanent
and unquestionable fashion the outcome of the War and in particular
the resultant emancipation of four million slaves:
But the war being over, those who had succeeded in re-establishing
the authority of the Federal government were not content to permit
this great act of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the
contest or the proclamation of the Executive, both of which might
have been questioned in after times, and they determined to place
this main and most valuable result in the Constitution of the restored
Union as one of its fundamental articles." 8
For Miller, the only "result" that needed to be put beyond question
was the illegality of human bondage. This narrow conception of the
evil of slavery was shared by the unsuccessful Northern Democratic
opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment who argued that the
Emancipation Proclamation and formal surrender did enough to
destroy slavery and that the Amendment would go too far in granting
blacks equality and revolutionizing federalism."9
Justice Miller praised the terms of the Amendment as embodying
the highest ideals and accomplishing a necessary, but limited purpose:
"this grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all the
human race within the jurisdiction of this government-a declaration
[which was] designed to establish the freedom of four million
slaves."' 20 According to Miller's narrative, the Amendment is "grand"
in the sense that it is heroic; it accomplishes something triumphant,
resounding and of great moment in history. The Amendment is also
"simple," as many heroic proclamations are. It is morally clear and
unambiguous and ultimately uncomplicated in its promise-freeing
four million persons from compelled service. "Its two short sections
seem hardly to admit of construction, so vigorous is their expression
and so appropriate to the purpose we have indicated."'' Grand and
it were contained in existing states it would eventually die out. See Brandwein,
Reconstructing Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 27.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 179-80.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 181-85.
118. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 68 (emphasis added).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 168-77.
120. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 69.
121. Id.
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simple, it is also frozen by Miller's opinion in its historical place,
unadaptable and plainly not in need of interpretation.'22
Justice Field, dissenting, agreed with the central Thirteenth
Amendment ruling, that "involuntary servitude" can only apply to
humans, not property.'23 However, Field took issue with the majority
for ignoring the Thirteenth Amendment's complexity, correctly
arguing that the Amendment was meant to guarantee a broad
conception of liberty for all persons,"' and full equality in the
enjoyment of fundamental rights.'25
Notwithstanding the logic of Field's dissent, Justice Miller's
majority opinion established a now-conventional view of the
Thirteenth Amendment: that it merely declared with permanence the
illegality of the institution of slavery that the War and the
Emancipation Proclamation had already established. According to
this view, the Amendment was thereby only the first, intentionally
incomplete step toward achieving equality for blacks, a process that
had to be completed through the adoption of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. 2 6
In United States v. Harris,'27 the only case in which the Supreme
Court considered the meaning of Thirteenth Amendment between the
Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights Cases, the Court
reiterated the former's shrunken view of the Amendment's purpose.
Harris considered under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
the constitutionality of section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the
"Ku Klux Klan Act"), 28 which criminalized conspiracies to deprive
any person of the equal protection or privileges and immunities of the
122. Justice Miller soon after partly undermines his position that no future
"construction" could be given to the Amendment by considering the framer's choice
to add the term "involuntary servitude" to the obvious prohibition on slavery. "The
word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, as the latter is popularly understood
in this country and the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions of
African slavery." Id.
123. See id. at 89 (Field, J. dissenting).
124. See id. at 90 (Field, J., dissenting).
The abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude was intended to make
every one born in this country a freeman ... and to enjoy equally with [all
others] the fruits of his labor. A prohibition to him to pursue certain
callings, open to others of the same age, condition, and sex... would so far
deprive him of the rights of a freeman, and would place him, as respects
others, in a condition of servitude.
Id. (Field, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 91-92 (Field, J., dissenting) (declaring that the 1866 Civil Rights Act was
premised on the Thirteenth Amendment theory that all citizens were entitled to equal
enjoyment of basic rights guaranteed by the Act and that "the measure was intended
to give effect to the declaration of the amendment, and to secure to all persons in the
United States practical freedom").
126. Id. at 70-71.
127. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
128. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
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law.129 Ignoring the facts in the indictment before it, which involved
white brutality against blacks, the Court reasoned that the Act, on its
face, contemplated punishment for violence against whites as well.
Such a law, the Court concluded, "cannot be authorized by the
amendment which simply prohibits slavery and involuntary
servitude."'3 ° The Court thus persisted in its "simple" classification of
the Thirteenth Amendment's goals of emancipation and additionally
concluded that the Amendment does not and cannot concern the
rights of whites -a conclusion deeply at odds with the enactors' broad
libertarian and egalitarian conception of the Thirteenth
Amendment. 3'
Next, in the Civil Rights Cases,32 the Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of section 1 and section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, which prohibited private acts of discrimination in the enjoyment
of accommodations and public conveyances'33 under the authority of
both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 34 The Court's
more famous ruling was that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
binds only state actors and, as such, Congress could not regulate
private conduct by legislation passed pursuant to section 5.135 The
Court recognized by contrast that the Thirteenth Amendment has no
state action requirement, entitling Congress to regulate private
conduct pursuant to section 2:136 "[Flor the [Thirteenth A]mendment
is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding
slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary
servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.' 37  Its
declaration of the Amendment's purposes (one upon which several
commentators rely to support its strong, modern applications) is
ultimately as dismissive as that offered ten years prior: "By its own
unaided force and effect [the Thirteenth Amendment] abolished
slavery, and established universal freedom." '138  The Court's
conception of the "universal freedom" guaranteed by the amendment
129. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13-14.
130. Harris, 106 U.S at 641 (emphasis added).
131. See infra text accompanying notes at 203-04 (discussing goals of freeing and
equalizing all citizens, white and black, north and south).
132. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
133. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 335-37.
134. The Act had a long and complex legislative history, where its constitutional
authority was frequently debated. Even after its passage in 1875, it remained unclear
whether the authority for the act was based primarily on section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment's authorization to secure equal protection of the law or on section 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment's authorization to enforce the Amendment's broad
prohibition on slavery. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest For Freedom: A Legal
History of the Thirteenth Amendment 48-49 (1976).
135. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
136. Id. at 19-20 (describing the Amendment as self-executing).
137. Id. at 20.
138. Id.
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is limited to its narrowest sense-freedom from state support and/or
protection of a system of human bondage.
The Court's limited conception of freedom's guarantee is confirmed
by its discussion of what it calls the Amendment's "reflex character,"
by which section 2 "clothes Congress with power to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery
in the United States."'39 The Court concedes that this power exists,
but questions whether "denial to any person of admission to the
accommodations and privileges of an inn, a public conveyance, or a
theater, does subject that person to any form of servitude, or tend to
fasten upon him any badge of slavery?"'' The Court ignored the
consensus of the Act's supporters and the strong language of its most
vocal proponents,"' the Court concluded that "badges and incidents
of slavery" related only to those deprivations suffered during
enslavement and did not "adjust what may be called the social rights
of men and races in the community" -aspects of life that must be left
to the individual states to regulate as they see fit. 42  To hold
otherwise, the Court reasoned, would be "running the slavery
argument into the ground.'1
4
Justice Harlan issued a powerful, solitary dissent in which he
summoned reason and evidence from the Amendment's ratification
debates. He chided the majority for its unrealistically narrow view of
the "freedom" guaranteed by the Amendment, 4  and advanced
instead the natural rights and equality-based premises held by the
Amendment's framers. 45  After a long proof of the Amendment's
broad goals, Harlan succinctly concludes, "The Thirteenth
Amendment alone obliterated the race line, so far as all rights
139. Id.
140. Id. at 21.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 181-85.
142. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20-22.
143. Id. at 24.
144. Id. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
But did the freedom thus established involve nothing more than exemption
from actual slavery? Was nothing more intended than to forbid one man
from owning another as property? Was it the purpose of the nation simply
to destroy the institution, and then remit the race, theretofore held in
bondage, to the several States for such protection, in their civil rights,
necessarily growing out of freedom, as those States, in their discretion, might
choose to provide?
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that freedom for Negroes
"necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, all discrimination
against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen
of other races"); id. at 40 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that by denying blacks
enjoyment of essential rights, equal to those of others, "a freeman is not only branded
as one inferior and infected, but, in the competitions of life, is robbed of some of the
most essential means of existence").
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fundamental in a state of freedom are concerned." '146 As such,
Congress was clearly authorized to prohibit private discrimination
under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.47
The Civil Rights Cases came six years after Reconstruction was
effectively ended by the Compromise of 1877. Under that
Compromise, Republicans agreed to back away from continued
enforcement of civil rights, allowing Southern states "home rule," in
exchange for allowing the Republican candidate in the contested 1876
election, Rutherford B. Hayes, to assume the Presidency.'48 The Civil
Rights Cases can thus be seen as one part of the broad-based national
decision to end Reconstruction, pursuant to which the Court limited
the reach of the Civil War Amendments in order to accommodate the
rigid political compromise already made.149 In doing so, the Slaughter-
House Cases and the Civil Rights Cases enshrined an understanding of
the Thirteenth Amendment that barely resembles the richness and
promise its ratifiers intended.
B. The Thirteenth Amendment.: The Final Step to Full Freedom
In clear contrast to the views of the majority in the Reconstruction
era cases, the broad-based Republican majority in Congress that
enacted the Thirteenth Amendment had been radicalized by the Civil
War. As a result, it held much broader and more intense beliefs about
the variety of harms associated with the institution of slavery.
Accordingly, it believed the destruction of slavery by constitutional
amendment would usher in the institution's exact opposite-
freedom-but, in a form full enough to counteract slavery's long-term
damaging effects to blacks and whites, and to the nation's founding
ideals. The debates over the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment and the passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
demonstrate that the Amendment was not merely a negative
guarantee against physical bondage nor was it a one-dimensional
precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the debates reveal
the Thirteenth Amendment as an independent and affirmative source
of rights.
Importantly, this understanding about the meaning of the
Thirteenth Amendment and its corresponding revolutionary effects
on federal-state relations was quite clear to all congressional
members, Republican supporters and Democratic opponents alike.
146. Id. at 40 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
148. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 574-87 (1988).
149. See Buchanan, supra note 134, at 70 (arguing that the burdensome task of
"reconciling the Constitution with the political mandate of the Compromise of 1877"
fell on the Supreme Court (quotation omitted)); see also C. Vann Woodward, The
Strange Career of Jim Crow 71 (1966) (explaining that "[t]he Court, like the liberals,
was engaged in a bit of reconciliation ... achieved at the Negro's expense").
2002] 1007
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Republicans lauded the Amendment as a necessary response to the
many evils of slavery and Democratic opponents, with their narrow
view of slavery's harms, decried it as too far reaching in its substantive
guarantees of freedom, in its usurpation of critical aspects of state
sovereignty, and in its unnecessary risk to the peace they believed was
complete after military victory and emancipation. My reading of the
original intentions of the Amendment's enactors, therefore, is not
merely based on isolated comments by only Congress's most radical
members or by the advocacy of only the Amendment's earliest
sponsors. Rather, the debates over the Amendment's ratification
reveal disagreement over the Amendment's wisdom, not over its
purpose of doing far more than emancipation and of granting
substantial affirmative rights. Examining the enactors' intentions,
therefore, is a particularly useful and valid method of understanding
the Thirteenth Amendment's largely forgotten meaning and is
necessary to unshackle the Amendment from its conventional, narrow
understanding.
1. More Than Mere Emancipation
When the Thirty-ninth Congress met in early 1865, the formal
surrender at Appomattox had not occurred. 1511 Congressmen
nevertheless anticipated that the rebellious states and their "hateful"
slave power, a "criminal" enterprise scornful of the "cherished
institutions that tend to secure the rights and enlarge the privileges of
mankind,' 151 would be vanquished.'52  After the November 1864
elections, which also brought President Lincoln a re-election
landslide, Congress became dominated by Republicans, 153 a party
composed of a rough amalgam of former Abolitionists and Free Soil
party members. 54 The more radical of the Republicans, led in the
Senate by Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson (both of
Massachusetts), and in the House by Thaddeus Stevens (also of
Massachusetts), James Ashley of Ohio and James Wilson of Iowa, had
made careers of opposition to slavery; they shared a vision of a nation
of free, independent laborers whose absolute entitlement to civil and
political equality would be secured by a strong federal government,
150. See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 848 (1988) [hereinafter
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom].
15 1. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1320 (1864) (statement of Sen. H. Wilson).
152. See Kolchin, supra note 111, at 202-08; see also Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d
Sess., 142 (1865) (statement of Rep. Orth) (arguing in January 1865 that slavery and
the rebellion were "dying" and that nothing could save it from "inevitable doom").
153. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, supra note 150, at 838 (stating that the
Thirty-ninth Congress would have three-fourths Republican majority); Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 111, at 863, 880 n.64.
154. Foner, Free Soil, supra note 11, at 120-48; Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under
Law 149-53 (1951).
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rather than by the various states.155 More moderate Republicans, led
by Lyman Trumbull of Illinois and John Sherman of Ohio and John
A. Bingham, the father of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,156
also from Ohio, had a less utopian social ideal and a more immediate
concern with securing practical freedom and civil equality for
freedmen. 57 Reacting to unfolding events between 1861 and 1866-
the rebellion of Southern States, the violence of the War, President
Andrew Johnson's ambivalence over Reconstruction, and post-bellum
Southern recalcitrance-the Republican party incorporated into its
mainstream ideological platform "radical" ideas previously deemed
"wild."158
Though there were obviously tensions within their Party, at the
outset of the debates over the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment
Republicans shared a basic commitment to the core concerns of the
free labor ideology. 15 9 The commitment centered around opposition
to "slave labor" and all that that entailed. The opposition to "slave
labor" encompassed rejection of sapping the motivation of slaves by
denying them incentives and education necessary to make work
productive, and debasing the dignity of all manual work, particularly
that done by poor whites, by associating it with the servility and
ignorance of slaves. 6 ' In stark ideological opposition to "slave labor"
stood the Republican vision of free labor, a system, which, in its
metaphorical essence, entitled men to enjoy "the fruits of their own
labor."1 '' Rather than relying on the wages or commands of another,
free labor principles suggested that through hard work, self-reliance
155. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 228-29. Professor Foner explains
that these men all came from "rapidly growing communities of family farms and small
towns, where the superiority of the free labor system appeared self-evident,
antebellum reform had flourished, and the Republican party, from the moment of its
birth, commanded overwhelming majorities." Id. at 228.
156. William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment 66 (1988).
157. See Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 230.
158. Id. at 244; Kolchin, supra note 111, at 206-09 (noting the revolutionary
momentum that the War and its consequences caused in shifting public opinion to
previously unimaginable "radical" positions); Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the
Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 Am. Hist.
Rev. 45, 47 (1987) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew];
VanderVelde, supra note 111, at 445 (noting that "[Henry] Wilson's faction of the
party, the so-called 'Radical' Republicans, is generally recognized as having carried
the day.").
159. The free labor ideology itself contained many ambiguities, as Professor Foner
has explained. The ambiguities had to be maintained in part to preserve a broad
political coalition. See Foner, Free Soil, supra note ill, at 130-33. It was even a
central component of the anti-slavery platform. See Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth
Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am. J. Legal Hist. 305, 308 (1988)
("The right to freely buy and sell one's labor was perhaps foremost in the antislavery
pantheon.").
160. See Foner, Free Soil, supra note 111, at 43-51; McPherson, Battle Cry of
Freedom, supra note 150, at 55.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 215-17.
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and discipline, a man could own his own property or the tools of his
craft and continue to advance economically and socially.162 Abraham
Lincoln had been an ideological father and rhetorical master of this
core Republican ideology.'63  Unlike the South's unhealthy
dependence on slave labor, Lincoln explained, the North maintained
"no such ... thing as a free man being fixed for life in the condition of
a hired laborer.... Men, with their families.., work for themselves
on their farms, in their houses, and in their shops, taking the whole
product to themselves, and asking no favors of capital on the one hand
nor of hired laborers or slavers on the other.""16 Republicans believed
slave and free labor systems were inherently incompatible, and that
slavery had to die out in order for the North's superior economic
system, as well as the principles upon which the Union had originally
been founded, to take hold.'65
A second major characteristic all Republicans shared at the outset
of the debates over the Thirteenth Amendment was the perception
that they had a unique opportunity to completely reconstitute the
degrading and destructive Southern way of life and start the country
anew in the Northern, free labor image.'66 Indeed, this broad
ambition was a central source of conflict with Northern Democratic
opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment. To these opponents,
slavery's central problem was its potential expansion into the western
territories and the corresponding requirement of federal government
intervention to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. Formal emancipation,
the South's military surrender, its renunciation of its secessionist
rights and agreement to abide by the laws of the United States
therefore defined for them the resolution to the crisis brought about
by slavery.'67
162. Foner, Free Soil, supra note 111, at 23-35; see also VanderVelde, supra note
111, at 459-95 (1989) (arguing that the antebellum free labor ideology carried over
into the Reconstruction debates and was defined in large part by a belief that with the
help of free institutions, workers could elevate themselves to independence from
employers and become their social equals).
163. See Foner, Free Soil, supra note 111, at 20. Even most ardent abolitionists
such as Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson came to regard Lincoln as the
Republicans' intellectual leader. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 344 (1865)
(H. Wilson) ("It was because Abraham Lincoln was our leader, the champion of our
ideas, that the world wept over his fall.").
164. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 28-29 (omissions in original).
165. Foner, Free Soil, supra note 111, at 313-17; Kolchin, supra note 111, at 197-99.
166. Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom 100 (1998) (quoting Illinois
Representative Isaac Arnold as claiming Northern victory would render "new nation"
because country was now "wholly free"). The opportunity was also a function of
political reality. The exclusion of ex-Confederates from the Thirty-ninth Congress
was an obvious strategic step taken to prevent resuscitation of Old Southern
institutions.
167. See Brandwein, supra note 111, at 34 (1999) (quoting statement of Rep. Phelps
from Kentucky who claimed that emancipation marked the "entire subversion of that
institution" and that "only purblind patriots still 'predict the revival or even affirm the
actual present existence of slavery"'); see also Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2985
1010 [Vol. 71
MODERN SLAVERY
Moreover, opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment argued that,
because all the problems of slavery were now eliminated, the
revolution to be wrought by the Thirteenth Amendment would only
perpetuate disunion, undermine the Southern states' right to
sovereignty, and threaten the "peace" finally achieved by
emancipation and surrender. 68 Justice Miller's narrative of the Civil
War and its conclusion appears to adopt this narrow, Northern
Democratic understanding of the harms of slavery and the
corresponding concern that the Thirteenth Amendment would
threaten a complete version of the peace the North finally obtained
with the Civil War's conclusion.
To Republicans, however, slavery did more than precipitate an
illegal secession. Slavery committed innumerable, deeply corrupting
crimes against the "life of a free nation." '69  It had undermined
"democratic institutions" and "the dignity of free labor"; it had
prevented the realization of every Republican principle espoused by
the Founders and trampled the Declaration of Independence; it had
spawned the "sumless agonies of civil war" and had crushed
"institutions of learning, benevolence, and religion;" it had filled
Southerners with a "dark and malignant hatred" for "the free states"
and "the toiling masses"; it had enslaved both slave and master."7"
Elimination of all of slavery's evils, therefore, provided a much
anticipated opportunity; adopting the Thirteenth Amendment would
usher in a Northern system of free labor, permitting the realization of
the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and protection of "the
(1864) (statement of Rep. Edgerton); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1865)
(statement of Rep. Rollins).
168. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1865) (statement of Rep. Julian)
(Thirteenth Amendment "cannot fail to add fuel to the flame, widen the breach
already existing, further embitter the South, and prolong the sanguinary contest");
Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2960 (1864) (statement of Rep. Holman) ("If you
amend the Constitution simply to render it hostile to the institutions of the South, you
will not restore the Union .... [T]he experience of history warns us against this
suicidal act."); id. at 2961 (arguing that the amendment will "provoke new and
permanent causes of hostility on the part of men now loyal to the Union"); id. at 2987
(1864) (statement of Rep. Edgerton) ("If this Congress desires to prove to the people
of the southern confederacy that they had a cause for beginning a war for their
independence, the proof cannot more effectually be made than by the passage of this
[amendment].").
169. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1320 (statement of Sen. Wilson)
170. Id. at 1320-21 (statement of Sen. Wilson); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
142 (1865) (statement of Rep. Orth); see also id. at 138 (statement of Rep. Ashley)
("[Slavery] so constituted its courts that the complaints and appeals of these people
could not be heard by reason of the decision 'that black men had no rights which
white men were bound to respect.' [It] has for many years defied the Government
and trampled upon the national Constitution."); id. at 155 (statement of Rep. Davis)
("Slavery ... has undertaken to destroy our Government, to subvert our institutions,
and to cause desolation and suffering and death throughout the length and breadth of
the land."); id. at 193 (statement of Rep. Kasson); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
1479-81 (1864) (statement of Sen. Sumner); id. at 1313 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
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sacred rights of human nature." '' It would allow the slave and the
other "wronged victim of the slave system"-the poor white man,
"impoverished, debased, dishonored by the system that makes toil a
badge of disgrace"-to "begin to run the race of improvement,
progress, and elevation.' 7 2  The adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment would breathe life into America and "change the
destinies of nations." As Professor James McPherson describes, the
final vote for adoption of the Amendment in the House set off
"prolonged and unprecedented... cheering," inspired Republican
House members to we[ep] "like children," and caused one member to
feel that he was "in a new country."'73 American business mogul
Edward Atkinson recorded in his journal the next morning: "Year 1
of American Independence."' 74
Yet, by the time of these debates, Southern slaves had already been
freed two years earlier by the Emancipation Proclamation.'75 Had not
the evil slave system thus already been destroyed? Why the enormous
elation and optimism if the Thirteenth Amendment accomplished
nothing? The answer to this puzzle is that the enacting Republicans
intended the Thirteenth Amendment to do much more than mere
emancipation could. As James Garfield noted in 1865, "What is
freedom? ... Is it the bare privilege of not being chained? If this is all,
then freedom is a bitter mockery, a cruel delusion. 176 Opponents of
the Amendment also recognized that "freedom" guaranteed by the
Amendment would mean much more than the elimination of physical
human bondage and made the Amendment's concededly broad goals
the very basis of their opposition.'77 The manumission of slaves
171. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong. 2d Sess. 142 (1865) (statement of Rep. Orth) ("The
effect of such amendment will be to prohibit slavery in these United States and be a
practical application of that self-evident truth, 'that all men are created equal ....');
id. at 154 (statement of Rep. Davis) (noting that slavery compromised the "great and
cardinal purposes for which the Government was framed" which "in the language of
that Declaration, had been proclaimed to the world as the inalienable inheritance of
every man").
172. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864) (statement of Sen. Wilson); see
also Cong. Globe 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 112 (1865) (statement of Sen. Wilson) ("We
have had four years of bloody conflict. Slavery, everything that belongs or pertains to
it, lies prostrate before us to-day, and the foot of a regenerated nation is upon it.
There let it lie forever.").
173. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, supra note 150, at 839-40.
174. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 66 (quotation omitted).
175. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, supra note 150, at 502-04.
176. Foner, Story of American Freedom supra note 166, at 100.
177. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2962 (1864) (statement of Rep.
Holman) ("What is the meaning of [the Thirteenth Amendment]? Is freedom the
simple exemption from personal servitude? No, sir; in the language of America it
means the right to participate in government .... Mere exemption from servitude is a
miserable idea of freedom. ... Then, sir, this amendment has some significance."); see
id. ("You run the hazard of all that to gratify your visionary fanaticism, the elevation
of the African to the august rights of citizenship."); see also infra text accompanying
notes 225-38.
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represented only part of the Thirteenth Amendment's purpose.
Republicans believed they had to "complete Emancipation... to see
that it is wholly done. Slavery must be abolished not in form only, but
in substance." '78 Thus, Congress set out to instill freedom in its fullest
form.
2. The Essence of Freedom: The Thirteenth Amendment, the 1866
Civil Rights Act and the Guarantee of Civil Rights
The Thirteenth Amendment of course drove a stake through
slavery's most obvious manifestations-the physical "dominion of one
man over the souls and bodies of his fellow men." '179 The Slaughter-
House and Civil Rights Cases got that much right. Having already
achieved emancipation of former slaves, however, the Amendment's
supporters believed they were attempting much more than providing a
negative right against the physical compulsion to work. Rather, they
considered the Amendment "the crowning act" or the "capstone upon
the sublime structure" of the Constitution; it was "the final step" to
full freedom, which included a positive guarantee to all persons the
equal enjoyment of all fundamental rights."'
a. Thirteenth Amendment Liberty
Members of Congress struggled to define liberty with reference to
both history and constitutional theory. Indeed, they were often
inseparable modes of argument. Senator Trumbull, Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, tried to define "liberty" by tautology: "Liberty
and slavery are opposite terms; one is opposed to the other." '181 By
abolishing slavery, the supporters of Thirteenth Amendment would
restore the liberties and institutions eliminated or corrupted by the
specific historical effects of the Southern slave power system.1 12
Primarily, however, they believed the Thirteenth Amendment would
restore all the natural rights to which persons in a republic are
entitled. Invoking Locke and Blackstone, Senator Trumbull
explained that, while all persons give up some natural rights by
178. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sumner); see
also Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer)
("[W]hat kind of freedom is that which is given by the amendment of the Constitution
if it is confined simply to the exemption of the freedmen from sale and barter?").
Because of the racial quality of American slavery, emancipation could not be enough
to guarantee freedom. If slavery was not racial, persons could pass from slavery to
freedom relatively easily. But, because American freedmen were easily identifiable
and considered less than human, a system of freedom needed more than mere
emancipation. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1116-17 (1866) (statement
of Rep. Wilson).
179. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1866) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
180. See tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 111, at 176 (1951).
181. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
182. See infra Part II.C.
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entering into civil society, they are entitled to basic "civil liberty,"
"that is the liberty which was intended to be secured by the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United
States originally, and more especially by the [Thirteenth] amendment
which has recently been adopted." '' I 3 Republicans could synthesize
the historical and theoretical modes of argument by contending that
the Southern slave system specifically corrupted the Founders'
constitution so that its abolition was therefore necessary to restore the
country to its original, high ideals. Massachusetts Representative
Thaddeus Stevens described the Civil War as the inevitable result of
"the vicious principles incorporated into the institutions of our
country." He continued,
Our fathers had been compelled to postpone the principles of their
great Declaration, and wait for their full establishment till a more
propitious time. That time ought to be present now. But the public
mind has been educated in error for a century. How difficult in a
day to unlearn it. In rebuilding, it is necessary to clear away the
rotten and defective portions of the old foundations, and to sink
deep and found the repaired edifice upon the firm foundation of
eternal justice.18 4
This restorative, natural rights theory of the Thirteenth
Amendment was shared by many of its framers. 5
The Thirteenth Amendment framers would have a chance to refine
their broad conception of natural liberty during debates over the
authority for the Freedman's Bureau and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
The proposed legislation and the corresponding debates over them
arose in response to a recalcitrant South's refusal to comply with
Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment's grand command; these
post-emancipation efforts to oppress freedman were viewed as a
continuation of the threat of slavery and helped Republicans distill
freedom's essence.
183. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
184. Id. at 2459 (statement of Rep. Stevens).
185. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865) (statement of Rep.
Orth) (explaining that "the Amendment will be a practical application of that self-
evident truth 'that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable rights; that among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness"'); Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 11.52 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Thayer) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment requires that "all features of
slavery which are oppressive in their character, which extinguish the rights of free
citizens, and which unlawfully control their liberty, shall be abolished and destroyed
forever."); id. at 1293 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 2779 (statement of Sen.
Eliot).
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b. Guaranteeing Practical Freedom
Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress soon learned that, despite
the formal adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment in December 1865,
their work was not entirely finished. Southern legislators enacted a
series of laws-Black Codes-to stabilize the emancipated black work
force and retain their labor cheaply. 186 Mississippi's legislative effort,
for example, entitled "An Act to Confer Civil Rights on Freedmen,"
barred freedmen from acquiring their own land and required them to
produce written evidence of employment (i.e., a labor contract) or be
subject to labor, a fine, or arrest by a white person."8 7 In South
Carolina, contract breach was deemed a crime and freedmen could
not work on their own in a store or as craftsmen without the approval
of a judge attesting to his moral character and the payment of a
licensing fee of up to one hundred dollars."' Ex-Confederate States
criminalized vagrancy, defining the punishable conduct variously as
"disorderly conduct," "idleness," "lewdness in speech," "misspending
earnings," "impudence or disrespect to an employer," or simply failing
to comply with a term of contract. Whites would routinely purchase
the labor of a convicted vagrant from the state and hold them to a
term of bondage.8 9 States prohibited the "enticement" of a servant
from his current employment, thereby constraining workers' ability to
leave an oppressive labor arrangement. 9" Apprenticeship laws
allowed whites to take the children of "unfit" freedman and hold them
to labor until adulthood. 9'
Republicans were outraged by the recalcitrance of the South
manifested by these Codes and described their obviously oppressive
186. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 198-99.
187. Daniel A. Novak, The Wheel of Servitude: Black Forced Labor After Slavery
2 (1978); see also Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 111 (1865) (statement of Sen.
Wilson).
They have enacted a law in the State of Mississippi that will not allow the
black man to lease lands or to buy lands outside of the cities. Where in
God's name is he to go? Into the public highway? Then he is a vagrant;
then he is taken up under the vagrant laws and sold into bondage.
Id.
188. Novak, supra note 187, at 4.
189. Id. at 2-8 (surveying various state vagrancy laws).
190. Id. at 4-5.
191. Id. Many of the laws were facially discriminatory or, if facially neutral, gave
whites a host of defenses. See id. Because of Northern outrage, by the end of 1866,
Southern states repealed many facially discriminatory laws. Nevertheless, the all-
white justice and law enforcement system simply enforced vagrancy, enticement, and
apprenticeship laws only against blacks. See Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111,
at 203. Republicans became aware of this discriminatory enforcement. Their
enactment of the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871 to prohibit discriminatory
application of laws, though passed primarily pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,
suggests that Republicans advocated for more than a mere formal equality model
even in 1866. See Brandwein, supra note 111, at 48.
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features on the record.'92 Far from "accepting the situation" of
Northern victory, Southerners were seeking "to again enslave
[freedmen], not perhaps by a sale on the auction-block as in the olden
time, but by vagrant laws and other laws and regulations concerning
the freedman."'93 Southern recalcitrance convinced Republicans that
they had to finish the job that the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment commenced. They assumed a moral obligation to
restore the Union to a state of true freedom and to end the oppression
of "the men we have made free."' 94 Senator Sumner explained that
their obligation was an essential aspect of enforcing a permanent
peace in the Union, beyond the mere surrender of arms that Northern
Democrats, and eventually the Slaughter-House Court, believed was
sufficient. Senator Sumner stated:
The knot which politicians could not untie during eighty years of
peace, the sword of Mr. Lincoln cut at with one blow. The power to
liberate, which is now confessed, involve[s] the duty to protect....
Wherever we turn in our legislative path, we encounter questions of
freedmen and freedman's rights. No peace will come that will 'stay'
until the Government that decreed freedom shall vindicate and
enforce its rights by appropriate legislation. 9 5
Congress was thus presented with a real "practical question" if
slavery should linger or if freedom could exist in reality; or, in other
words, if freedman in fact "shall have the benefit of this great charter
of liberty given to them."'96
Because almost all Republicans agreed the Civil War was "a war for
the establishment of free labor, call it by whatever other name you
will," the Southern effort to establish "slavery, less the protection
which the master formerly afforded his chattel,"'97 radicalized
Republicans and energized their efforts for Reconstruction.' Once-
moderate Senator Trumbull introduced a civil rights bill that would
192. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2084 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Perham) ("They may accept the fact of emancipation, but they still believe that
slavery is the best condition for the colored race, and it is but reasonable to suppose
that as far as possible this idea would, if they were allowed to govern, be embodied in
law .. "); id. at 589 (statement of Rep. Donnelly) (describing Black Codes of
Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee and Virginia).
193. Id. at 2404. (statement of Rep. Ingersoll).
194. Id. at 112 (statement of Sen. Wilson); Id. at 41 (statement of Sen. Sherman)
("1 believe it is the duty of Congress to give to the freedmen of the southern States
ample protection in all their natural rights."); id. at 74 (statement of Rep. Stevens)
("The infernal laws of slavery have prevented [the freedmen] from acquiring an
education, understanding the commonest laws of contract, or of managing the
ordinary business of life. Thus Congress is bound to look after them until they can
take care of themselves.").
195. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2334 (1866).
196. Id. at 1151 (statement of Rep. Thayer).
197. Id. at 589 (statement of Rep. Donnelly).
198. See supra note 111.
1016 [Vol. 71
2002] MODERN SLAVERY 1017
give citizenship to freedmen and prohibit all "discrimination in civil
rights or immunities." His goal was to "give effect" to the Thirteenth
Amendment's "abstract truths and principles" and to "secure to all
persons within the United States practical freedom." '199
The debate over the authority under section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment 200 to enact what would become the Civil Rights Act of
1866 highlighted the Republican's broad conception of freedom
enshrined by section 1. Representative Thayer explained the
reciprocal nature of the two sections:
I thought when I voted for the amendment to abolish slavery that I
was aiding to give real freedom to the men who had so long been
groaning in bondage. I did not suppose that I was offering them a
mere paper guarantee. And when I voted for the second section of
the amendment, I felt in my own mind certain that I had placed in
the Constitution and given to Congress ability to protect and
guaranty the rights which the first section gave them.
20 1
Thus, the relatively broad powers of enforcement in section 2 point
to the relatively broad scope of protection afforded by section 1.202
Section 2 could not have been intended to grant Congress the narrow
and unnecessary power to enforce emancipation. Rather, it was
intended to grant Congress the power to enforce those rights afforded
by section 1.
What rights were those? The right to make or break labor
contracts-"to work when and for whom he pleases" ;213 the right to
199. Cong. Globe 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1865) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
200. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2.
201. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866).
[U]nder the constitutional amendment which we have now adopted, and
which declares that slavery shall no longer exist, and which authorizes
Congress by appropriate legislation to carry this provision into effect, I hold
that we have a right to pass any law which, in our judgment, is deemed
appropriate, and which will accomplish the end in view, secure freedom to
all people in the United States.
Id. at 475 (statement of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1118 (statement of Rep. Wilson) ("A
man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in this [civil rights] bill cannot be reduced
to slavery. Anything which protects him in the possession of these rights insures him
against reduction to slavery. This settles the appropriateness of this measure, and that
settles its constitutionality."); id. at 1152 (statement of Rep. Thayer) ("[Bly virtue of
the second section of the amendment of the Constitution Congress has express power
to pass laws which will guaranty and insure that these great rights and immunities of
citizenship [are respected] .... ); id. at 41 (statement of Sen. Sherman) ("Here is not
only a guarantee of liberty to every inhabitant of the United States, but an express
grant of power to Congress to secure this liberty by appropriate legislation.").
202. See Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of
Education, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 457 (1996) (demonstrating that debates over
the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment on issue of segregation elucidates
intentions of framers of Fourteenth Amendment itself).
203. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1865) (statement of Sen. Wilson); see
id. at 1152 (statement of Rep. Thayer).
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sue and be sued and to testify in court and to have equal access to the
common law;204 and the right to buy and sell and convey property 05
In addition, liberty secured by the Thirteenth Amendment included
the right to equal protection of the laws of the country.2"6 All of these
rights were ultimately included in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Republicans still predominantly regarded voting as a
privilege, rather than a right and accordingly, most did not believe
that the Thirteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act would protect
such privilege.2""
Importantly, Republicans understood that slavery wrought more
than degradation upon slaves and free blacks. It hurt free white men,
debased the dignity of the labor of the "toiling masses," and poisoned
democratic institutions." 9 It also negated the civil rights of thousands
of white opponents of slavery.21 The Thirteenth Amendment,
204. Id. at 111 (statement of Sen. Wilson).
205. Id. Some Republicans saw these guarantees as necessary incidents of the
national citizenship the proposed civil rights bills provided:
Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live, the right of personal
security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These
are the rights of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute rights,
there are others, such as the right to make and enforce contracts, to
purchase, hold, and enjoy property, and to share the benefit of the laws for
the security of person and property.
Id. at 1756 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
206. Id. at 340 (statement of Sen. Wilson) (explaining that a former slaveowner
"must deal with his former slave as a man having equal rights with himself before the
laws of the country"); id. at 1152 (statement of Rep. Thayer); see also id. at 92
(statement of Sen. Sumner) (noting that the civil rights bills proposed by Republicans
include "the absolute obliteration of all legal discriminations founded on color").
Professor tenBroek suggests that the right to equal protection in enjoyment of all civil
rights was "itself counted among men's fundamental 'civil rights and immunities."'
tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 111, at 187.
207. section I of the 1866 Civil Rights Act provided,
That all persons born in the United States... are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
208. See Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 11, at 245; tenBroek, Thirteenth
Amendment, supra note 111, at 181.
209. See infra text accompanying note 280-82.
210. As just one example of this articulated concern, Iowa Representative James
Wilson, clearly referring to white abolitionists who were harassed in Southern States
declared, "Twenty million free men in the free States were practically reduced to the
condition of semicitizens of the United States; for the enjoyment of their rights,
privileges, and immunities as citizens depended upon a perpetual residence north of
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therefore, was meant to protect all "citizens, from the highest to the
lowest, from the whitest to the blackest, in the enjoyment of the great
fundamental rights which belong to all men. ' 1 1 Moreover, securing
these rights was essential not just for the thousands of liberty-deprived
persons. The Republican ideology and understanding of their place in
history included a conviction that the rights they were guaranteeing
were, in a fundamental sense, collective. As Senator Wilson
explained, "we have advocated the rights of the black man because
the black man was the most oppressed type of the toiling men of this
country .... The same influences that go to keep down and crush
down the rights of the poor black man bear down and oppress the
poor white laboring man. "212 The grant of fundamental rights and the
national protection of civil rights and equality would remake,
reconstitute or reconstruct the entire country.1 3 Vindicating these
rights would advance deep collective, normative commitments to
equality now embedded in the Constitution by the Thirteenth
Amendment.214
Mason and Dixon's line." Therefore, he concluded, "It is quite time, sir, for the
people of the free States to look these facts squarely in the face and provide a remedy
which shall make the future safe for the rights of each and every citizen." Cong.
Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202-03 (1864); see also Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
138 (1865) (statement of Rep. Ashley) ("[Slavery] has silenced every free pulpit
within its [terrible] control,. .. [i]t has denied the masses of poor white children
within its power the privilege of free schools, and made free speech and a free press
impossible within its domain."); id. at 237 (statement of Rep. Smith) (complaining
that the principle of "equal privileges" among the states "was denied to the whole
North by the South unless the man adhered to the sentiments of the South" and that
"men from the North could not go to the South and to speak their real sentiments");
id. at 13 (statement of Rep. Kasson) (explaining that "numbers of men who have been
driven from their farms.., because in opinion they did not agree with those who
adhere to the institution of slavery").
Though beyond the scope of this article, Republicans' recognition of chronic
Southern violations of the civil liberties of whites supports the view that the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "privileges and immunities" was meant to
apply most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the states. See Amar, supra note
111, at 181-215.
211. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson); id.
at 343 ("[W]e mean that the poorest man, be he black or white, that treads the soil of
this continent, is as much entitled to the protection of the law as the richest and the
proudest man in the land."); tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 111, at 187
("The Civil Rights Bill was intended to be permanent, truly countrywide and inclusive
of 'persons of all races."'); Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note
111, at 897 n.153 (demonstrating that contemporary newspaper opinions recognized
that Republicans were attempting to secure rights of all Americans, not just black
Americans).
212. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866).
213. See, e.g., id. at 589 (statement of Rep. Donnelly) ("[I]f the object of all
government, is to advance the prosperity of the people, can you do so by ruining one
eighth of the entire population? The true issue before the South is justice or anarchy.
We must save the South from herself.").
214. See infra text accompanying notes 372-76.
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c. A Distinctive Libertarianism
In addition to the egalitarian vision of the Thirteenth Amendment,
in which all persons would be guaranteed equal enjoyment of all the
minimum entitlements and incidents of freedom, Republicans
advanced a distinctive libertarian vision as well.2 15  As previously
described, Republicans were energized by the opportunity to replace
the Southern slave labor system with a free labor system. Freedmen
in the South needed the same prospects for economic independence
and social advancement as laborers had in the North, which was
reiterated after the Civil War as a right "to enjoy the fruits of their
own labor. 21 6 This concept embodied a right to control one's basic
life choices free from constraints put in place by private actors. Thus,
freedmen should be free "to work when they please, to play when
they please, to go where they please, to work at what they please, and
to use the product of their labor. ''2 7 A core libertarian guarantee was
thus the right to quit one's job free from negative consequences.
To carry out this vision concretely, the Thirty-ninth Congress
passed additional legislation to liberate laborers from highly coercive
peonage arrangements. Peonage had actually earlier appeared in the
United States in 1846 with the acquisition of the New Mexico
territory; a system of peonage had long been established there as an
aspect of Spanish rule.218 In 1867, Congress finally criminalized
peonage in New Mexico and all other parts of the United States with
the federal Anti-Peonage Act which was, like the 1866 Civil Rights
Act, passed pursuant to section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.219
215. Professor VanderVelde suggests the term "labor vision" to describe this more
radical part of the Republican agenda. VanderVelde, supra note 111, at 437. 1 prefer
the term "libertarian vision" because "labor" was primarily incidental to achieving
independence. If one could control his own labor, he would not be subject to wages
or a master and would control his own destiny as an autonomous person. Thus, labor
was instrumental to the larger goal of independence.
216. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1865) (statement of Sen.
Wilson); id. at 504 (statement of Sen. Howard) (arguing that each of the freedmen
had the right to "own the bread he earn[s] and [eats]").
217. Id. at 41 (statement of Sen. Wilson).
218. James Henry Haag, Involuntary Servitude: An Eighteenth-Century Concept in
Search of a Twentieth-Century Definition, 19 Pac. L.J. 873, 877-78 and n.5 (1988).
219. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1581 (1948)). The Act provided in relevant part,
[T]he holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as
peonage is hereby declared to be unlawful, and the same is hereby abolished
and forever prohibited in the Territory of New Mexico, or in any other
Territory or State of the United States; and all ... laws ... which have
heretofore established, maintained, or enforced ... the voluntary or
involuntary service.., of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or
obligation ... are hereby [] declared null and void; and any person.., who
shall hold.., or return ... any person ... to a condition of peonage, shall...
be punished by fine... or by imprisonment ....
Id. Neither the original Anti-peonage Act nor 18 U.S.C. § 1581 provide for a private
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The Anti-Peonage Act further demonstrates the Republican
congressional commitment to upending the traditional barriers to
individual economic autonomy.
The Republican libertarian vision also included a positive,
aspirational quality. Led by Senator Wilson, many Republicans
considered the Black Codes deeply degrading, oppressive and
arbitrary.22" Though prominent Republicans were not free from the
widely shared notions of racial inferiority, they thought that was
largely beside the point. Responding to arguments that former slaves
were not fit to have freedom, Republicans countered by arguing that,
if a former slave is as ignorant or brutish as some claimed, it would do
him no good to deny him rights essential for self-improvement. "If he
is not to remain a brute," Minnesota Representative Donnelly argued,
"you must give him that which will make him a man-opportunity. '2 1
Accordingly, a man in a free society should not be condemned until he
has had a chance to fail on his own; he should be free from private or
public oppression. Donnelly explained,
If he is, as you say, not fit to vote, give him a chance; let him make
himself an independent laborer like yourself; let him own his
homestead; let the courts of justice be opened to him; and let his
intellect, darkened by centuries of neglect, be illuminated by all the
glorious lights of education. If after all this he proves himself an
unworthy savage and brutal wretch, condemn him, but not till
then.222
"No man" he continued, "can rest with safety upon the mercy and
generosity of any other man. 223
Thus, as a central part of their vision of a good society, Republicans
believed that a man, on his own, unconstrained by private coercion or
legal obstacle, must have the opportunity to move up in the world. He
should have the chance to own land or work for himself, to educate
himself and his children, and ultimately to fulfill the basic human,
natural desire to protect and better himself. In the words of Senator
Wilson, a man should be able to "walk[] the earth, proud and erect in
the conscious dignity of a free man, who knows that his cabin,
civil cause of action. See Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978).
220. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1865); see also id. at 340 ("The tendency
of such legislation as that is to continue him an ignorant, degraded and dependent
laborer.").
221. Id. at 589 (statement of Rep. Donnelly).
222. Id.
[W]e must offer equal opportunities to all men .... If you give the negro an
equal opportunity with the white man, he becomes perforce a property-
holder and a law-maker, and he is interested with you in preserving the
peace of the country. If you hand him over to oppression, if you deprive him
of all hope, if you debase him into a brute, you can expect nothing from him
but poverty, turbulence, and wretchedness.
M. (statement of Rep. Donnelly).
223. Id.
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however humble, is protected by the just and equal laws of his
country. '224 Republicans enacting the Thirteenth Amendment were
morally committed to that vision.
3. Civil Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Revolution in
Federalism
The dominant concern of opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment
and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, beyond what they saw as its seemingly
absurd promise of equality for freedmen, was the apparently
revolutionary transformation it would render in federal-state
relations. Representative Holman contended that the creation of
federal power to guarantee Negroes equal rights would be "fatal to
the Constitution, fatal to the fundamental principles of the Republic,
the irrepressible right of the States to domestic government. 225
Having opposed the Thirteenth Amendment on the grounds that it
would authorize the federal government to supplant state authority,
the same opponents later reversed course and claimed the Thirteenth
Amendment could not authorize the 1866 Civil Rights Act or the
Freedman's Bureau. 226 The Thirteenth Amendment, claimed Edward
Cowan, an outspoken Conservative Republican Senator from
Pennsylvania, "was not intended to overturn this Government and
revolutionalize all the laws of the various States everywhere. '227
224. Id. at 111. Senator Wilson could even summon empirical proof for his
libertarian vision. During the debates over outlawing the peonage system in New
Mexico, in which men were held to a degrading state of debt bondage, Wilson
described that men freed from that oppressive system did in fact thrive in a state of
freedom: The peonage system "has disappeared in the large [New Mexican] towns,
and peons who once worked for two or three dollars a month are now able to
command respectable wages, to support their families, elevate themselves, and
improve their condition." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571 (1867).
225. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1864); see id. at 186 ("The change you
propose is a fundamental change of your Government never before contemplated by
its founders.").
It proposes a revolutionary change in the Government. It seeks to draw
within the authority of the Federal Constitution and the Federal Congress a
question of local or internal policy belonging exclusively to the slaveholding
States, and is in conflict with the principles on which the Union was
originally formed, and with the whole theory and spirit of the Constitution as
to the rights of the States.
Id. at 2986 (statement of Rep. Edgerton).
226. See tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 111, at 189-91.
227. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan); see
id. ("[I]f under color of this constitutional amendment we have a right to pass such a
law as this, we have a right to overturn the states themselves completely."); id. at 1154
(statement of Rep. Eldridge) (stating that the Civil Rights Bill "is another of the
measures designed to take away the essential rights of the States"); id. at 185
(statement of Sen. Davis) (objecting that the Civil Rights Act would "wholly absorb
all reserved state sovereignty and rights"); id. at 478 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury)
(stating that this bill positively deprives "the States of their power of police
regulation").
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The Republican congressional majority did not disagree with their
opponents' characterization of their enactments; they fully recognized
that a revolution was indeed in place and necessary. After conceding
that the Civil Rights Act was "absolutely revolutionary," Maine
Senator Thomas Morrill asked, "But are we not in the midst of
revolution? '228 In order to enforce the new civil rights agenda, the
federal government permitted states to retain authority over ordinary
civil and criminal affairs; however, all matters related to enforcement
of civil rights would be subject to federal supervision. The Thirteenth
Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1866 meant that state officials
and state courts could no longer be trusted to guarantee the equality
of fundamental rights bestowed by national citizenship and the
Thirteenth Amendment's guarantee of freedom.229
The Civil Rights Act authorized federal district attorneys, marshals
and Freedman's Bureau officials to bring suit to remedy violations of
the Act's broad natural rights guarantees and made all persons,
including local officials, liable to fine or imprisonment.230 It did not
create a permanent national police force. Rather, it left enforcement
primarily for the federal courts.21  The federal government had
previously been considered by many to have the greatest potential for
tyranny and the states the greatest bulwark against it. As part of the
constitutional revolution rendered by the Civil Rights Act and later,
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Federal Government would become,
in Senator Sumner's words, the new "custodian of freedom. '232
228. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 570 (1866).
229. Representative Wilson, a vocal advocate of a theory of national citizenship
unencumbered by state law bias, explained, "If the States would all observe the rights
of our citizens, there would be no need of this bill .... But, sir, the practice of the
States leaves us no avenue of escape, and we must do our duty by supplying the
protection which the States deny." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-18 (1866);
see also id. at 475 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (explaining that the Civil Rights Act
provides that "no person whose equal civil rights are denied him in the State courts
shall be tried by those courts for any offense, but that he shall have a right to remove
his cause into the courts of the United States, and be there tried").
230. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, §§ 1-4. Senator Trumbull, the
author of the bill, expressly copied most of the enforcement provisions of the bill from
the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 475 (1866). Though
certainly aware of the irony in "enact[ing] a law as efficient in the interests of
freedom, now that freedom prevails throughout the country, as we had in the interest
of slavery," it was a good doctrinal model. Id. The Fugitive Slave Act was one of the
first laws enacted to give congress-and the federal courts-the enforcement of rights
over which states traditionally had retained jurisdiction. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
231. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, § 3. Cf Foner, Reconstruction,
supra note 111, at 245 (calling placement of enforcement entirely upon federal
judiciary "unrealistic").
232. Foner, Story of American Freedom, supra note 166, at 106. Kaczorowski, To
Begin the Nation Anew, supra note 158, at 47 (stating that the extension "to citizens
federally enforceable guarantees for the protection of their civil rights was itself a
revolutionary change in American federalism").
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Because Republicans had obtained nearly unanimous consent in
passing the Civil Rights Act, it came as quite a surprise to many that
the Republican President Andrew Johnson vetoed it.2 3 In his veto
message, he warned that the Bill represented
an absorption and assumption of power by the General Government
which, if acquiesced in, must sap and destroy our federative system
of limited powers and break down the barriers which preserve the
rights of the states. It is another step, or rather stride, toward
centralization and the concentration of all legislative powers in the
National Government.
234
Republicans believed the Bill was clearly right, and so, in April 1866,
for the first time in American history, Congress overrode a President's
veto.
235
When Congress considered the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment soon after, what was still most controversial about the
Civil Rights Act, especially in light of the political battles with the new
President, was its authority to transform federal-state relations; the
substantive equality or freedom guarantees of the Amendment or its
enacting legislation was not as significantly at issue. There remained a
nagging question of whether a single legislative act could take the
protection of civil equality away from the states and give it to the
federal government and its agents. More controversial still was
whether Congress itself could, through the Civil Rights Act, grant full
citizenship with its attendant privileges and immunities, to a class of
persons.23 6 The Fourteenth Amendment is thus in one obvious sense a
strategic device to resolve these controversies conclusively. Professor
Foner explained that, as the split with the President deepened,
"Republicans grappled with the task of fixing in the Constitution,
beyond the reach of Presidential vetoes and shifting political
majorities, their understanding of the fruits of the Civil War." '237
The Fourteenth Amendment certainly overlaps some critical
aspects of the Thirteenth Amendment, and grounds the legislation
passed pursuant to section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment on even
firmer constitutional footing. However, the political reality that a
subsequent congressional session felt it pragmatically wise to enact the
Fourteenth Amendment should not, by itself, render the Thirteenth
Amendment devoid of independent meaning or force. To the
233. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 246-47.
234. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 111, at 904 (citing
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1681 (1866)).
235. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 250-51.
236. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 111, at 903-06.
237. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 251; see also tenBroek, Thirteenth
Amendment, supra note 111, at 201 ("[T]he Thirteenth Amendment played an
important part in the evolution of the Fourteenth Amendment ... because, after its
passage, doubts about its adequacy became so serious as to make it seem advisable to
try do the same job all over again by another amendment.").
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contrary, the Thirteenth Amendment debates in the Thirty-eighth and
Thirty-ninth Congresses reflect the firm intentions of the
Amendment's enactors, without any expectations that their intentions
would change or that they would have to enact additional or more
substantive constitutional protections in the future. Those intentions
were clearly not limited to the narrow goal of setting slaves free from
their masters. Proponents believed, as did opponents, that the
Thirteenth Amendment would secure broad affirmative rights,
including the equal enjoyment of all the minimum entitlements of
freedom necessary to national citizenship.238
Unfortunately, the submergence of the Thirteenth Amendment
under supposedly broader Fourteenth Amendment goals has left the
interpretive possibilities offered by the Thirteenth Amendment and
its deep commitment to equality and freedom from various forms of
labor exploitation relatively unexplored. Once resuscitated, however,
the Amendment can be used to solve concrete human rights problems
and can provide a valuable foundation for broader civil rights
protections.
C. The Thirteenth Amendment and Free Labor
After the Civil Rights Cases, the Court's next significant
opportunity to interpret the Thirteenth Amendment came at the turn
of the nineteenth century, after a period of racial retrenchment in the
South.23 9 In the Peonage Cases,24 ° the Court struck down, on
Thirteenth Amendment grounds, two updated variations of the Black
Codes designed to keep blacks in a state of labor bondage.241 The
Peonage Cases failed to directly address the manifest racial purpose
and impact of the Southern laws at issue or to make explicit the laws'
antebellum pedigree. As a result, the cases missed an opportunity to
fully explicate the Thirteenth Amendment concern of ending caste
oppression. Nevertheless, the Court did advance one central concern
of the Thirteenth Amendment framers in striking down the peonage
laws: the unacceptability of coercive private labor arrangements that
inhibit the mobility of labor and the corresponding opportunities for
achieving personal and economic independence.
238. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text. Most congressmen agreed that
voting was a privilege rather than a right that national citizenship required. See supra
notes 151-77.
239. See infra text accompanying notes 240-85.
240. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S.
219 (1911).
241. See infra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
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1. Peonage: Slavery's Second Generation
After the end of Reconstruction and the Court's perverse
announcement in the Civil Rights Cases that blacks must "cease[] to
be the special favorite of the laws,' '242 Southern states empowered with
"home rule" wasted little time in sparking a counterrevolution and
resuscitating one favorite aspect of the Southern economy-cheap
black labor.243  During the 1880s and 1890s, "the variety of legal
structures designed to keep [black agricultural] worker[s] in a state of
quasi slavery were refined, strengthened, and made a part of the fabric
of southern life and law." '44 For example, Southern Redeemers in the
South Carolina legislature criminalized simple breach of contract, and
other states used broad false pretenses statutes to criminalize breaking
of a contract without repaying advances. Furthermore, reconstruction
era vagrancy laws, enticement laws and apprenticeship laws were still
in place and were upheld under constitutional challenge, 245 no doubt
in part as a result of dismissive Reconstruction-era Supreme Court
precedent. 246
The most repressive feature of the Redeemer South, however, was
the convict leasing system. Men, almost universally black,247 served on
chain gangs leased to private Southern planters, or were simply
bonded by surety contracts to a period of servitude to a white
employer, almost always for petty or trumped-up charges. If the
convict failed to complete the required period of servitude, he would
be reimprisoned for this additional violation. 48  In effect, the
242. 109 U.S. 3,25 (1883).
243. See Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 111, at 564-601, 602. After the
Compromise of 1877, one Republican politician announced that "the policy of the
new administration will be to conciliate the white men of the South. Carpetbaggers to
the rear, and niggers take care of yourselves." Id. at 581.
244. Novak, supra note 187, at 29.
245. Id. at 34. The South Carolina Supreme Court was typical of state courts
during the era in rejecting claims that these laws forced "involuntary servitude" in
violation of the newly enacted Thirteenth Amendment. Ignoring the fact that
imprisonment would not actually relieve the underlying debt at issue, the South
Carolina court reasoned that
every one who undertakes to serve another in any capacity parts for a time
with that absolute liberty which it is claimed that the constitution secures to
all, but, as he does this voluntarily, it cannot be properly said that he is
deprived of any of his constitutional rights; and, if he violates his
undertaking, he thereby, of his own accord, subjects himself to such
punishment as the law-making power may have seen fit to impose for such
violation.
State v. Williams, 10 S.E. 876, 877 (S.C. 1890).
246. See infra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
247. Novak, supra note 187, at 33 (noting that, in Mississippi, "most of the convicts
(ninety-two percent) are negroes of the lowest class. They are generally overworked,
and the death rate is high" (quoting 1886 Labor Commission report on convict
labor)).
248. See id. at 35 (citing a study by U.S. District Court Judge Emery Speer, an
opponent of the peonage system in the South, which concluded that in one Georgia
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Southern court system operated as an employment agency for white
plantation owners, making the state-enforced bonded labor of blacks
and the prison system enormously profitable. 249  The South had
metamorphized the slave psychology by simply adjusting its legal
apparatus to the toothless constraints of the Reconstruction
Amendments as interpreted and had replicated critical economic
features of the antebellum slave system.2 °  As W.E.B. Dubois
concluded in his history of Reconstruction: "[t]he slave went free;
stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back again toward
slavery. 251
2. The Thirteenth Amendment Response
In Bailey v Alabama,252 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the conviction of an itinerant black farm laborer,
Alonzo Bailey, under an Alabama fraud law. Bailey had accepted an
advance of $15 in exchange for a promise to work for one year.253 He
left after a little over one month without paying the remaining
obligation of his advance. 4  He was then convicted under an
Alabama law that made breaking an employment contract without
repaying an advance prima facie evidence of criminal fraud.255
Alabama argued that this law was simply a variation on the
established crime of theft by false pretenses and that the evidentiary
presumption was necessary because of the difficulty of proving
criminal intent to defraud. 256 The Court, however, reasoned that the
statute improperly reversed the defendant's presumption of innocence
and exposed Bailey "to conviction for fraud upon evidence only of
breach of contract and failure to pay.
2 57
In practical effect, the law compelled performance of a contract
under the threat of criminal prosecution which, the Court concluded,
county, in the course of only one month, "149 people (almost all black) had been
sentenced to a total of nineteen years at labor for crimes no more serious than
walking on the grass or spitting on the sidewalk").
249. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and
Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 646, 651
(1982). Professor Schmidt quotes contemporaneous reports demonstrating that the
demand for slave labor put pressure on the criminal justice system to "convict as
many negroes as possible." Id. at 692. In order to support the demand for leased
labor, petty offenses would be punished with large fines and felonies would often be
reduced to misdemeanors so that fines could be imposed and assumed by employers.
Id.
250. See Novak, supra note 187, at 41.
251. W.E.B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction in America 30 (Atteneum 1979) (1935).
252. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
253. Id. at 229.
254. Id. at 230.
255. Id. at 229.
256. Schmidt, supra note 249, at 681.
257. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 236.
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violated the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court declared that the
Amendment was meant "to render impossible any state of bondage;
to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal
service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit. '258
More broadly, the Court proclaimed that the Thirteenth Amendment
was a "charter of universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever
race, color or estate, under the flag" and that it intended to "abolish
slavery" and "to make labor free. 259
Three years later in United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court
confronted the harshness of Alabama's criminal surety system.20 Ed
Rivers, a black man, had pleaded guilty to petit larceny in Alabama
county court. Because he could not afford the fine or court costs
imposed by the judge, he was sentenced to almost sixty days of hard
labor. A white Southerner named Reynolds paid the fine in exchange
for Rivers' promise to work approximately ten months as a
farmhand.26 1 After one month, Rivers quit and was again imprisoned
pursuant to Alabama's criminal surety law and fined double what he
had been originally fined by the court. In order to avoid the
equivalent 115-day stint in a chain gang, Rivers entered into a
different surety contract to work on a plantation for fourteen months.
According to Professor Benno Schmidt's calculations, Rivers "was by
now committed to work more than seven times as long as he would
have been required to had he elected to work off his original
conviction. 262
Recognizing that criminal surety system had become an engine of
oppression of blacks, the U.S. Department of Justice chose to
prosecute Reynolds under the 1867 Anti-Peonage Act.263 Reynolds
argued that criminal surety laws did not compel service in obligation
of a debt, but punished for a crime and thereby fell within the
Thirteenth Amendment's allowance for involuntary servitude after
criminal conviction.264 Indeed, according to Reynolds' lawyers, the
258. Id. at 241.
259. Id.
260. 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
261. Schmidt, supra note 249, at 692.
262. Id. at 692-93.
263. Id. at 695. In Clyatt v. United States the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act under the enforcement power of section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment. 197 U.S. 207, 218 (1905). The Court defined peonage as "a
status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to
his master. The basal fact is indebtedness." Id. at 215. The case involved the
conviction of a white man, Clyatt, who had forcibly returned two black men to a
condition of peonage in violation of the Act. Id. at 209. Over a strong opinion by
Justice Harlan, who criticized the Court for ignoring the racially oppressive reality of
the emerging Southern peonage system, id. at 223 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), the Court reversed the conviction on a technical reason that the
two blacks had never been in its narrowly defined condition of peonage to which they
could be returned. Id. at 222.
264. Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 138.
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system offered the convict a "humane" choice between the forced
labor of a chain gang and private labor, which tended to be easier
work.265 The Court's opinion upholding Reynolds' conviction was a
highly formalistic response to this argument and, like the opinion in
Bailey, disregarded the inherent racial element of the peonage system
at issue.
The Court reasoned that the state was not involved in setting the
terms of the surety contract or ultimately supervising the labor for
which the parties privately contracted. The debt thus ran to private
surety and the laborer was compelled to work under fear of criminal
punishment.266  Performance of service under the constant fear of
imprisonment renders the work compulsory, "as much so as authority
to arrest and hold his person would be if the law authorized that to be
done. ' 267  Far from offering the attractive or humane choices, the
Court concluded that the criminal surety system operated to keep the
convict "chained to an everturning wheel of servitude.
'
"
268
To modern, realist eyes, a striking feature of the Court's decisions
in both Bailey and Reynolds is its failure to acknowledge the strong
sectional and racial features inherent to the peonage system under its
review. The Court was certainly aware that these laws persisted only
in the South as a relic of antebellum slavery. 269 Bailey's lawyers also
pressed the Court to consider the racially oppressive nature of
Alabama's peonage system.7 ° Indeed, faced with evidence of the
265. Id.
266. Id. at 146.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 146-47.
269. These features were public knowledge. The horrors of the peonage system
were salaciously reported in the Progressive newspapers of the era. See Schmidt,
supra note 249, at 655-56.
Urban newspapers and leading magazines had a journalistic field day with
the characters and melodrama of peonage: sinister overseers, baleful
whipping bosses, pathetic victims, conniving officials, desperate midnight
dashes for freedom, frantic chases, cruel horseback captures, and all the
antebellum paraphernalia of bondage-whips, chains, guns, hounds, clubs,
and filthy, overcrowded stockades.
Id. A widely-cited Justice Department report catalogued abuses suffered by blacks as
a result of peonage. See Charles Russell, Report on Peonage (1908). In addition,
although the Court in Clyatt v. United States also failed to consider the race of the two
black victims in the case, Justice Harlan's dissent took special note of this practical
reality. 197 U.S. 207, 223 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting how the case disclosed
"barbarities of the worst kind against these negroes").
270. Bailey's brief to the Court asserted that the law applied to "service rendered
by the commonest laborer or the poorest tenant of the farmlands" because, "as a
matter of common knowledge in Alabama, such laborers and such tenants are, as a
class, negroes." Schimidt, supra note 249, at 680. The Attorney General's brief
included a statement from a U.S. Attorney in Louisiana stating that "I do not believe
that there is a well-advised man in the State, lawyer or layman, that does not know
that this act was passed in order to give the large planters of the State absolute
dominion over the negro laborer." Id. at 681. Specifically, lawyers argued that the law
violated the principle of Yick Wo v. Hopkins that the law must not be administered
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racial feature inherent in the Alabama scheme and the broad
Thirteenth Amendment values it undermined, the Court's opening
lines in Bailey appear almost defensive: "We at once dismiss from
consideration the fact that the plaintiff in error is a black man.
2 71
Disregarding the practical reality of Southern life, the Court
continued:
No question of a sectional character is presented, and we may view
the legislation in the same manner as if it had been enacted in New
York or in Idaho.... Opportunit[y] for coercion and oppression, in
varying circumstances, exist[s] in all parts of the Union, and the
citizens of all the States are interested in the maintenance of the
constitutional guarantees, the consideration of which is here
involved.272
The system of enforced racial oppression of the earlier Black Codes
had outraged enactors of the Thirteenth Amendment even when they
assumed a facially neutral form, because the Codes represented
recalcitrant attempts to reenslave the class of freedmen.273 The
obvious intended effects of the Codes convinced Congress the
enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment was necessary through
the Civil Rights Act in order to liberate freed blacks from the
southern racial caste system and to secure them equality and
"practical freedom. "274 The Southern schemes at issue thus clearly
conflicted with the egalitarian principles that Republicans believed
the Thirteenth Amendment's declaration of full freedom ushered in.
Perhaps the Court's reluctance to consider the racial inequality
enforced by the peonage laws can be explained by the Court's then-
hostility to claims for racial justice brought against facially neutral
laws 275 or perhaps it can be explained as a lingering consequence of
the Court's conciliatory role in carrying out the Compromise of
1877.276 It can also be explained as a deliberate strategic decision by
with "an evil eye and an unequal hand." 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
271. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 231 (1911).
272. Id.
273. See supra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 193-214; see also Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 589 (1866) (statement of Rep. Donnelly) ("[I]t is as plain to my mind as the
sun at noonday, that.., we must break down all walls of caste .... ").
275. See Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (holding that Mississippi's
grand jury qualification scheme, which granted broad discretion to administrative
officers and had wildly disparate impact against blacks, did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee in absence of proof of actual discrimination); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that separate facilities for African Americans
did not deprive them of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882) (upholding prohibition
on interracial marriage and enhanced punishment for interracial fornication); see
generally Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 303.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 132-49; see also Randall Kennedy, Race
Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 1622, 1647 (1986) (claiming that the suppression of race and sectional
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the Court to avoid antagonizing the South with recriminations over
race.277 In any event, by ignoring the racial dynamic at issue in the
Peonage Cases the Court merely lost an opportunity to explicate an
additional dimension of the Thirteenth Amendment. 28  It did not,
however, foreclose any future interpretation that recognizes the
Thirteenth Amendment's egalitarian and anti-caste norms.
More important, the Peonage Cases did advance several important
components of the Republican Thirteenth Amendment vision. First,
by proclaiming that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to
prohibit "that control by which the personal service of one man is
disposed of or coerced for another's benefit, '279 the Court was
advancing a central Republican insistence that men be able to enjoy
the "fruits of their own labor. ' 2 ° This distinctive libertarian vision
required that labor be mobile and untethered to absolute control of
another private person and that men must have the right to control
basic life choices, including when and for whom they work. In such a
free system, Republicans believed that men could partake in the
continuing, natural process of progressing toward economic
independence and social improvement.2 1  The Peonage Cases thus
recognized that the Southern peonage system severely impeded labor
mobility and recreated the stagnant Southern economy dependent
upon "slave labor" that had motivated Thirteenth Amendment
framers.
Second, by correctly describing the Thirteenth Amendment as a
"charter of universal civil freedom" that applies equally to all races
and classes,282 the Court recognized that the Amendment was enacted
to end the many degradations the slave system perpetrated against all
Americans-slaves, free blacks and whites.283 Third, by invalidating
agreements that Alabama claimed were entered into voluntarily by
blacks, or that were at least not as transparently coerced as
antebellum slave labor, the Court recognized that freedom from
slavery is an inalienable right; that no matter his economic
differences in the Peonage Cases should be seen as "twin aspects of the tacit deal that
was struck in American political culture after the destruction of Reconstruction in the
late 1870's").
277. See Schmidt, supra note 249, at 715 (arguing that Justice Hughes' colorblind
opinion was evidence that "the Court was now willing to attack the racist institution
of peonage with a constitutional principle of resilient neutrality and that a race-silent
approach was the best tactic to win over a majority of the Justices to the cause of
intervention").
278. See Koppelman, supra note 98, at 502-03 (observing that Bailey failed to
explicitly advance Thirteenth Amendment's egalitarian premise and anti-caste goals).
279. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
280. See supra text accompanying note 274.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 151-79.
282. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 241.
283. See supra Part II.B.
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desperation or immediate need, one cannot consent to or sell oneself
into slavery-like labor agreements. 214.
In addition, the Peonage Cases implemented the Republican free
labor conviction that coercive labor arrangements, even if they appear
voluntary, degrade both the worker and the master, as well as the
nation as a whole and that such ariangements impede collective
progress to a good society.2 5 The Peonage Cases thus vindicate an
important, collective value that the Thirteenth Amendment's enactors
intended it to enshrine.
D. The Thirteenth Amendment and Equality at Mid-Century
Professor Risa Goluboff has recently demonstrated the prominent,
though underreported, role that the Thirteenth Amendment played in
the Justice Department's civil rights strategy in the period between
the end of World War II and the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
v. Board of Education.6 The story she tells is important because it
offers a model for an expanded, modern view of the Thirteenth
Amendment, which suggests its still-underutilized promise for civil
rights advocacy.
At the end of the War, concern for Cold War appearances and real
political pressure from African-American groups turned the recently-
formed Civil Liberties Section of the Department of Justice toward
the protection of civil rights of African-Americans, particularly in the
South." 7 Lawyers in the Civil Rights Section faced considerable
doctrinal obstacles in the way of enforcing civil rights guarantees
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment; namely, the requirement of
state action,28 the narrow zone of jurisdiction in which the federal
government could operate in place of the states, 2 9 and the long
shadow of Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal principle.211 The
lawyers recognized that the Thirteenth Amendment, by contrast,
allowed prosecution of private action and clearly authorized federal
jurisdiction over peonage as a result of the federal Anti-Peonage
Act.
291
284. Justice Holmes based his dissent in Bailey in part on the uncharacteristically
"Lochneresque" view that desperate people should not be denied the option of
entering into contracts they think will make them better off, no matter how bad that
seems to others. Specifically, he contended that laws criminalizing breach of contract
actually in are in the best interest of poor laborers who could use the guarantee of
enforcement to negotiate for better contract terms. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 249-50
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
285. Seesupra Part II.C.
286. Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil
Rights, 50 Duke L.J. 1609 (2001).
287. Id. at 1619-28.
288. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
289. See id. at 17-18.
290. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
291. Goluboff, supra note 286, at 1648-59.
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With considerable success in the lower courts, lawyers in the Civil
Rights Section attempted to deemphasize elements of voluntariness
that had traditionally governed assessment of peonage and
involuntary servitude. Instead, the lawyers focused on the actual
status of the laborer, emphasizing the isolation, vulnerabilities and
other indicia of coercion as, well as the conditions of their servitude.
292
The lawyers also emphasized the impact that certain informal
structures had on the life of Southern black laborers, such as lack of
education, physical or sexual violence, and the harshness of the
work;293 these features were disregarded by the Peonage Cases.294 The
Civil Rights Section thus framed the problem of coercive labor
arrangements as a civil rights issue under the Thirteenth Amendment
rather than as a free labor issue as conceived by the Peonage Cases,
and employed the Thirteenth Amendment in order to relieve some of
the oppression and caste status endured by blacks in the South.295
The Justice Department's success in the lower courts in
deemphasizing elements of indebtedness or voluntariness and
presenting the real, practical obstacles to the equal enjoyment of the
rights of citizenship and conditions that inhibit the mobility of labor
captured some of the central concerns of Republican framers of the
Thirteenth Amendment. In Pollock v. Williams,296 a case prosecuted
by the Civil Rights Section, the Court struck down a Florida fraud
scheme nearly identical to the one at issue in Bailey. Justice Jackson's
majority opinion explicitly emphasized one additional aspect of the
Republican free labor dogma-the corrosive effects forced labor has
on all labor:
When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the
obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no
incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome
conditions of work. Resulting depression of working conditions and
292. Id. at 1663-68.
293. See id. at 1663 (describing affidavit of Elizabeth Coker, who complained that
she worked hard, "never ate a meal at the table the whole time" and had "no clothes,
no shoes, and but seventy cents in money"); id. (describing allegations of Polly
Johnson, who complained that "she slept in a hen house and suffered sexual abuse,
beatings, no wages, poor conditions and treatment, and work too strenuous for a
young woman" and "was 'not allow[ed] ... to have any playmates ... was never sent
to school nor allowed to visit anyone, nor to attend church"') (alteration in original)
(omissions in original); id. at 1665 (describing the Department's interest in
prosecuting man who held a laborer's son as a way to prevent her from leaving her
employment).
294. See supra notes 239-51 and accompanying text.
295. Goluboff, supra note 286, at 1665-68; see also id. at 1664 ("Metaphorical
meanings and nonlegal understandings of words like slavery, peonage, and
involuntary servitude converged with the Justice Department's aspirations for the
Thirteenth Amendment.").
296. 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
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living standards affects not only the laborer under the system, but
every other with whom his labor comes inmcompetition. 297
The Civil Rights Section's success in reviving a fuller, Republican
conception of the Thirteenth Amendment had beneficial collateral
effects as well. Goluboff explains that a doctrinal "convergence"
occurred between the Justice Department's Thirteenth Amendment
civil rights strategy and the New Deal's emphasis on broad protections
for laborers and the expanded authority for the federal government
interventions it ushered in. 98
Whether the link was causal or symptomatic, the new baselines
created by the New Deal for the conditions in which people worked
paralleled expanding definitions of involuntary servitude, and the
Section's civil rights practice used different legal tools to address
various forms of coercion to work. Peonage and involuntary servitude
represented more extreme forms of unfree labor, with redress through
the Thirteenth Amendment. The abridgement of the rights to
organize, to strike, or to receive decent wages constituted more
mundane manifestations of legal and economic coercion; the
Department of Justice combined New Deal labor legislation with
Reconstruction civil rights statutes to ensure the integrity of those
rights. 99
Indeed, because New Deal legislation such as the Fair Labor
Standards Act expressly excluded from coverage categories of
predominantly black agricultural and domestic labor,3"' the Civil
Rights section used the Thirteenth Amendment to fill in the gap and
to combat racial hierarchy and labor exploitation at the same time.3"1
The Civil Rights Section's use of the Thirteenth Amendment
eventually faded in the 1950s as a result of an internal Justice
Department decision to rely on the Fourteenth Amendment.3 2 Since
the Brown v. Board of Education decision,3 3 the civil rights
establishment has largely committed itself to using the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy racial
inequality. The Thirteenth Amendment as a civil rights tool has thus
fallen largely into desuetude.3"4 Nevertheless, the litigation strategy
297. Id. at 18; see also Goluboff, supra note 286, at 1669-70 (recognizing
Republican free labor "pedigree" in Justice Department's broad conception of the
Thirteenth Amendment).
298. Goluboff, supra note 286, at 1674.
299. Id. at 1676-77.
300. See infra Part III.A.2.
301. Goluboff, supra note 286, at 1679-80.
302. Id. at 1681-82.
303. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
304. But see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment authorizes legislation banning discrimination in private
schools as a badge or incident of slavery); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968) (holding that section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes legislation
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and successes of the Civil Rights Section's early years demonstrates
the doctrinal flexibility of the Thirteenth Amendment, and its natural
applicability to situations involving the often-related issues of race and
labor. The story also demonstrates how the Amendment's application
in a core category of cases can highlight and make available
connections with complementary constitutional theories. It suggests
that the Thirteenth Amendment can again be used to develop a
dynamic and broad-based civil rights strategy.
III. THE CONSTITUTION AS A SWORD: VINDICATING THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The modern, third-generation form of slavery described in Part II
implicates the core concerns of the Thirteenth Amendment. Modern
victims' work is performed under various forms of physical or
psychological threat as well as under conditions that deprive victims of
essential aspects of their humanity, rendering their labor coerced
rather than free. In addition, victims are most typically exploited as a
result of their unequal social or economic status.3"5 These cases call
for the invocation of the broad egalitarian and distinctive libertarian
promise of the Amendment.
Compared to this broad constitutional promise, currently available
civil remedies for modern victims of slavery and involuntary servitude
are neither adequate nor appropriate. Section 1983 cannot be used
against the private defendants in slavery cases because this statutory
vehicle only prohibits unconstitutional conduct by state or local
officials. °6 In addition, the use of the primary remedy currently
employed by victims of modern slavery, the FLSA, continues the
awkward fiction in constitutional law of grounding civil and human
rights remedies in the commerce clause, recently made vulnerable to
judicially enforced federalism,3"7 rather than the Reconstruction
amendments which are obviously dedicated to attacking human and
civil rights deprivations.
Moreover, while the FLSA and the patchwork of related state law
causes of action might in coordination materially compensate victims
as much as a single Thirteenth Amendment remedy, they all address
only the incidental harms associated with slavery or involuntary
servitude.3"' As such, they are inadequately expressive remedies; they
fail to communicate the appropriately strong message of moral
condemnation that the unconstitutionally exploitative activity in these
prohibiting on discrimination in the sale or purchase of property as a badge or
incident of slavery).
305. See supra Part II.D.
306. See infra text accompanying note 312.
307. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
308. See infra text accompanying notes 317-41.
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cases demands .3  Finally, limiting plaintiffs to state common law
remedies would subvert a central transforming purpose of the
Thirteenth Amendment-to create a federal liberty interest
independent of state law protection. 311
Congress could exercise its considerable powers under section 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment 31' to provide a comprehensive civil
remedy that addresses the panoply of harms and communicates the
appropriate moral condemnation of slavery and involuntary servitude.
Failing that, however, courts should recognize a direct cause of action
under the Thirteenth Amendment for damages, following the logic of
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents in order to adequately enforce
the vision of the Thirteenth Amendment enactors. My argument is
not that these men themselves would have authorized or even
contemplated private causes of action for damages under the
Thirteenth Amendment. Rather, I contend that courts should employ
a relatively modern procedural mechanism of a Bivens-type action to
carry out the substantive views of the framers of the Thirteenth
Amendment. Private plaintiffs should be allowed to use the
Thirteenth Amendment as a sword, to commence litigation that will
construct a positive constitutional law of the Thirteenth Amendment
and ultimately, like the Civil Rights Section over a half-century ago,
develop a broader and firmer foundation for civil rights protections.
A. Inadequacy of Current Remedies
1. The Current Patchwork
a. Inapplicable Civil Rights Statutes
Congress has not yet created a civil cause of action for violations of
the Thirteenth Amendment. The relevant constitutional actors in
most cases of slavery or involuntary servitude are private actors.
Therefore, litigants cannot sue for deprivations of their Thirteenth
Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because that statute
authorizes suits against only state or local government officials.3 12
Another civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) authorizes civil suits
against private conspirators who intentionally deprive persons of
equal protection of the laws. 313 However, this statute does not permit
309. See infra text accompanying notes 372-76.
310. See infra text accompanying notes 321-24.
311. See infra text accompanying notes 375-79.
312. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
313. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000) provides, in relevant part,
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
1036 [Vol. 71
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suits for underlying Thirteenth Amendment violations, nor does it
apply to discriminations not motivated by race or class based
animus. 31' Although race and social class inequalities are certainly
relevant in cases of modern slavery,315 perpetrators are typically
motivated by economic considerations, rather than the class based
prejudice of the kind the Supreme Court requires under section
1985(3).316
b. Inadequate State Law Torts
A variety of state common-law torts can be employed to remedy
certain aspects of the slavery or involuntary servitude experience.
The tort of false imprisonment can be used to compensate victims for
periods in which they are physically bound.317 The tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress can be used to compensate victims if
the concededly outrageous conduct toward them results in actual
physical injury.318 The tort of fraudulent inducement can be used to
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws.., whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States,
the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more
of the conspirators.
314. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (holding that under §
1983, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant was motivated by "some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" (emphasis added)).
315. See infra text accompanying note 400.
316. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (holding
that discriminatory animus against abortion seekers or women in general is not
covered under § 1985(3)); United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,
833, 839 (1983) (holding that § 1985(3) does not apply to conspiracies motivated only
by commercial or economic animus and that "group actions generally resting on
economic motivations should be deemed beyond the reach of § 1985(3)"); Bryan v.
City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 276 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that § 1985(3) requires "an
allegation of a race-based conspiracy"); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 1985(3) claims must have some racial or otherwise class
based discriminatory animus behind the alleged conspirators' action); Gagliardi v.
Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 194 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that the Supreme Court
in Griffin included a class-based animus requirement to prevent § 1985 from being
used as a "general federal tort law" for any conspiratorial interferences with the rights
of others).
317. The tort of false imprisonment generally requires: (i) an intent to confine a
person to fixed boundaries; (ii) actual confinement; (iii) awareness of confinement.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (1965). Initial consent to the working
arrangement, the acceptance of minimal wages and the physical opportunity to escape
over the typically long period of the servitude, might preclude a successful claim of
false imprisonment. See Lopez v. Winchell's Donut House, 466 N.E.2d 1309 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1984). The elements of the tort also vary from state to state. Compare Lorensen v.
State, 249 A.D.2d 762, 763 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding that lack of consent is
expressly required), with Johnson v. Weiner, 19 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1944) (finding that
lack of consent is not required).
318. The tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress generally requires that (1)
the defendant causes severe emotional distress; (2) intentionally or recklessly, (3) by
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compensate victims for financial losses resulting from
misrepresentations made to them."9 Employed independently, the
torts do not cover the full range of harms experienced by victims.
Used collectively and depending on the particular factual
circumstances, these torts could provide damages in an amount equal
to a comprehensive Thirteenth Amendment remedy. In either case,
however, these state common-law causes of action would not
vindicate the important federal values enshrined by the Thirteenth
Amendment, nor do they communicate the appropriate level of moral
condemnation required by the Amendment's prohibition on such
conduct.32
Indeed, a central and concededly revolutionary aspect of the
Thirteenth Amendment was its intended transformation of federal-
state relationships. Most all members of the Thirty-ninth Congress,
proponents and opponents alike, recognized that the Amendment and
the 1866 Civil Rights Act passed pursuant to its authority would take
primary responsibility for the protection of civil rights away from the
states and place it with the federal government.32 The federal
government was designated the "new custodian of freedom" and the
broad new federal rights enshrined by the Amendment and the Civil
Rights Act were subject entirely to federal supervision.322 Therefore,
restricting victims of slavery and involuntary servitude to background
state common-law torts to remedy violations of obviously federally
protected interests would subvert a central purpose of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
2. FLSA, the Commerce Clause Fiction and the Need for a Natural
Linkage Between Rights and Remedies
The primary civil remedy employed in modern slavery cases is the
Fair Labor Standards Act.323 The FLSA is an obvious doctrinal choice
extreme and outrageous conduct. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 46 (1965).
Generally, however, courts do not allow claims for emotional distress in the absence
of physical personal injury. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 302 (2000).
319. The tort of fraudulent inducement compensates only for economic harms
caused by mispresentations. See Dobbs, supra note 318, § 349 (defining fraudulent
inducement as a "stand-alone economic or commercial tort that causes financial harm
without causing physical harm either to person or property").
320. See infra text accompanying note 372; see also Manliguez v. Joseph, No. 01-
CV-7574, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2002) (creating a
private cause of action for involuntary servitude and using the statute of limitations
for civil rights actions rather than for false imprisonment actions because "classifying
Plaintiff's claim as a false imprisonment claim would not address Plaintiff's forced
labor or its constitutional implications").
321. See infra text accompanying note 350.
322. See infra text accompanying note 350.
323. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000); see Joey Asher, How the United States Is Violating
Its International Agreements to Combat Slavery, 8 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 215, 220 (1994)
(explaining that lawyers are using the FLSA as the primary remedy for involuntary
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for lawyers, in part because of its beneficial evidentiary
presumptions324 and straightforward damages scheme to award unpaid
minimum wages due,325 and in part because of a lack of clear
alternatives. Aside from its simple compensatory formula, however,
the FLSA does little to advance Thirteenth Amendment values.
Moreover, its deployment in slavery cases continues an undesirable
fiction of grounding human rights protections in the language and
theory of the commerce power.
Passed in 1938, the FLSA was part of the New Deal progressive
market reform.326  Around the time of its drafting the Roosevelt
administration was in a pitched battle against the Supreme Court's
commitment to state sovereignty and formalist conceptions of the
commerce power.3 2' Despite support among labor constitutionalists
for grounding New Deal labor reforms in a broad reading of the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of coercive labor
arrangements,328 the Roosevelt administration rested the FLSA on
servitude cases); Hidden in the Home, supra note 25, at 27, 30-31 (describing
predominance of FLSA as civil remedy in involuntary servitude cases). Various states
have analogous state minimum wage and hour provisions that can be employed as
well to obtain unpaid back wages. See, e.g., California Minimum Wage for All
Industries, Cal. Lab. Code § 1182.11 (West 2002); New Jersey Wage and Hour Laws,
N.J. Stat. Ann. 8, 34:11-56(a) et seq. (West 2002); New York Minimum Wage Act,
N.Y. Lab. Law § 652 et seq. (McKinney 2002).
324. Under the FLSA, if a defendant fails to keep records of hours of employment
and deductions for room and board as is required by 29 U.S.C. § 211(c), a court
should presumptively accept a plaintiff's testimony regarding hours worked and
award back wages, even if such an award is merely approximate. See Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946).
325. An employer's failure to pay the statutory minimum wage entitles an
employee to collect back wages for all unpaid hours worked, plus an equal amount in
liquidated damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b); Martin v. Selker Bros., 949 F.2d 1286,
1299 (3d Cir. 1991).
326. The FLSA was passed in 1938, but had been conceived much earlier out of
Labor Secretary Perkins' concern about the constitutionality of the wage and hour
provisions of its predecessor, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). It
effectively replaced NIRA after the Supreme Court ruled NIRA unconstitutional in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See John S. Forsythe,
Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 Law & Contemp. Probs. 464,
464-65 (1939); see also George E. Paulsen, A Living Wage for the Forgotten Man:
The Quest for Fair Labor Standards 1933-1941 (1996).
327. See Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 276-80 (1982). The FLSA was a
component of Roosevelt's response to the ideological dominance of laissez-faire
capitalism in the courts, in which he made realist arguments about the imprisonment
that poverty and bargaining weaknesses impose on working men and women. See
Foner, Story of American Freedom, supra note 166, at 200-10 (describing Roosevelt's
attempt to reclaim the word "liberty" from conservatives and make it a rallying cry
for New Deal reforms); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 56-60 (1993)
(explaining that New Deal reforms depended on successfully demonstrating that
government protection of individuals living standards was as important to freedom as
Lochner era insistence on protection from the government).
328. See infra text accompanying notes 354-60.
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various theories of Congress's commerce clause power.329 The Act
was primarily justified as a means of remedying the market-distorting
effects of unequal bargaining power between industrial workers and
management, and providing a minimum income for survival.33 Save
for some sparing but characteristic references by Roosevelt to
freedom and fairness,33 the FLSA has since its adoption been justified
as an important part of federal macro-economic policy by stabilizing
markets and increasing consumer spending, all without triggering
unemployment or inflation.332
329. Then-Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson testified to Congress that
"This act combines everything, and is an effort to take advantage of whatever theories
may prevail on the Court at the time the case is heard." Forsythe, supra note 326, at
467 n.21. Jackson proffered over a half dozen constitutional theories, all based on
variations of the commerce power, to support the FLSA; none related to the
Thirteenth Amendment. Id.; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)
(upholding the FLSA as constitutional exercise of congressional commerce power).
330. Senator Hugo Black reported out of the Senate Labor and Education
Committee that
It is ... those low-wage and long-working hour industrial workers who are
the helpless victims of their own bargaining weakness, that this bill seeks to
assist .... [A] start should be made at the present session of the Congress to
protect this Nation from the evils and dangers resulting from wages too low
to buy the bare necessities of life and from long hours of work injurious to
health.
S. Rep. No. 75-884, 3-4 (1937); see also Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697,
706 (1945) (explaining that the purpose of the FLSA's minimum wage provision is to
"protect certain groups of the population from sub-standard wages... due to...
unequal bargaining power").
331. See H.R. statement of Rep. No. 93-913, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2817-18 (citing President Roosevelt's message to Congress on
May 24, 1937).
And so to protect the fundamental interests of free labor and a free people
we propose that only goods which have been produced under conditions
which meet the minimum standards of free labor shall be admitted to
interstate commerce. Goods produced under conditions which do not meet
rudimentary standards of decency should be regarded as contraband and
ought not to be allowed to pollute the channels of interstate trade.
Id. ("A self-supporting and self-respecting democracy can plead no justification for
the existence of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling workers' wages or
stretching workers' hours.").
332. See S. Rep. No. 75-884, at 2 (1937) (Statement of President Roosevelt)
(explaining that the FLSA will help "to reduce the lag in the purchasing power of
industrial workers and to strengthen and stabilize the markets for the farmers'
products" and that "both working simultaneously will open new outlets for productive
capital"); H.R. statement of Rep. No. 93-913, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2818 (citing President Truman's statement at the signing of the
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949) (stating that the FLSA "has proved to be
wise and progressive remedial legislation for the welfare not only of our wage earners
but of our whole economy"); id. at 2818-19 (citing President Kennedy's message to
Congress on Feb. 2, 1961) (explaining that an increase in FLSA's minimum wage rate
will "improve the income, level of living, morale, and efficiency of many of our lowest
paid workers, and provide incentives for their more productive utilization. This can
actually increase productivity and hold down unit costs, with no adverse effects on our
competition in world markets and our balance of payments").
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As primarily a tool of national economic policy, the FLSA is hardly
an obvious source for a strong civil rights or human rights program.
Indeed, in order to accommodate powerful Southern voting interests
in Congress committed to preserving the racial hierarchy in their
home states,333 the FLSA was drafted and passed excluding from
coverage the two primary sources of African-American labor at the
time, domestic service and agriculture.3 Southerners' arguments for
such exclusions were grounded, as usual, in the need to respect state
sovereignty-the standard rhetorical proxy for preserving a southern
caste system. As Florida representative Mark Wilcox explained:
There has always been a difference in the wage scale of white and
colored labor. So long as the Florida people are permitted to handle
the matter, this delicate and perplexing problem can be adjusted....
You cannot put the Negro and the white man on the same basis and
get away with it .... There just is not any sense in intensifying the
racial problem in the South, and this bill cannot help but produce
such a result.... This is just another misguided interference of our
uninformed neighbors in a delicate racial problem that is gradually
being solved by the people of the South.335
Despite pleas from Negro leaders that the discriminatory exclusions
of such categories of predominately Negro labor would perpetuate a
relic of slavery, 336 Roosevelt acceded to Southerners' political leverage
with a superficial nod to federalism-by making accommodations to
333. David M. Potter, The South and The Concurrent Majority 70 (1972) ("[T]he
South's misgivings about social change derived in considerable measure from the fact
that almost any kind of change might challenge the hi-racial system. Wage and hour
laws were resisted partly because they might mean equal wages for Negroes and
whites."); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1335, 1373 (1987) (describing the
strong voting power that Southerners wielded during the New Deal and their fear
"that if the benefits of such [New Deal social welfare] programs were extended on an
equal basis to whites and blacks, the southern racial and economic caste system would
be destroyed").
334. See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev.
1, 26 (1999) [hereinafter Forbath, Caste, Class] (discussing the exclusion of the two
primary categories of African-American labor-domestic service and agricultural
labor- from the FLSA).
335. 82 Cong. Rec. 1, 404 (1937); see also 81 Cong. Rec. 7, 881 (1937) (South
Carolina Senator Ed "Cotton" Smith objecting that the FLSA, would overwhelm the
"splendid gifts of God to the South" which included warm climate, ability to work
outside without much clothing and which, therefore, made black labor cheap).
336. John P. Davis, of the National Negro Congress, testified that the exclusion
would continue the helplessness that Negro labor felt during the NRA code hearings
against the demands from southern industry for "those occupations, industries and
geographic divisions of industries in which the predominant labor supply was Negro."
This helplessness, he explained, was an essential remnant of slavery. See Mark Linder,
Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the
New Deal, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1335, 1374 n.260 (1987) (quoting Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1937: Joint Hearings on S. 2474 and H.R. 7200, Before Senate Comm. on
Education and Labor and House Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong. 571 (1937) (statement
of John P. Davis, member, National Negro Congress)).
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"geographical diversity. 33 7 Indeed, it was in part a response to the
FLSA's exclusions that the Civil Rights Section in the 1940s employed
the Thirteenth Amendment to help African-Americans in exploitative
labor conditions.33 In 1974, Congress finally expanded the FLSA's
coverage to domestic servants.33 9 Nevertheless, in light of its early
accommodations of federalism and its racial entailments, the FLSA
presents an awkward pedigree for remedying the civil and human
rights violations committed against persons trafficked into slavery.
Moreover, because interpretations of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause have consistently been tied to historically
shifting definitions of "commerce" and conceptions of the proper
limits on federal power to interfere with concerns typically governed
by the states,3" the FLSA's coverage of domestic workers does not
rest on the firmest constitutional foundation. The 1974 Amendments
could conceivably fall to the Supreme Court's recent revival of
judicially enforced federalism announced in United States v. Lopez341
and United States v. Morrison.342 Lower court cases decided prior to
Lopez had routinely upheld commerce clause challenges to FLSA's
application to domestic servants. 3 3  However, the regulation of
domestic service implicates zones of traditional state authority that
might make the Rehnquist Court suspicious that Congress is
regulating commerce only indirectly and is overtaking areas of life
that are "truly local": 344 the family home, domestic chores, children. 34
337. See Linder, supra note 333, at 1373 (quoting Roosevelt as saying, "Even in the
treatment of national problems there are geographic and industrial diversities which
practical statesmanship cannot wholly ignore").
338. See Goluboff, supra note 286, at 1678-89 (explaining that the New Deal
exclusion of African Americans prompted the Civil Rights Section to use the
Thirteenth Amendment "to justify federal intervention into employment
relationships that Congress had deemed local, private, and off-limits to the federal
government" and to thereby compensate for the constitutional limitations of the
commerce power).
339. See Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811. The Act now mandates minimum wage payments for
"employees in domestic service." 29 U.S.C. § 206(f) (2000). The regulations
promulgated under section 206 of the Act explain that "domestic service" means
"services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about a private
home," including such employees as "cooks, waiters, butlers, valets, maids,
housekeepers.... laundresses, caretakers,... and babysitters employed on other than
a casual basis." 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (2002).
340. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 808-24 (3d ed. 2000).
341. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
342. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
343. See Marshall v. Rose, 616 F.2d 102, 105 (4th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Cordero,
508 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D.P.R. 1981); Ruenkamol v. Stifel, 463 F. Supp. 647, 648
(D.N.J. 1978).
344. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 ("The Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local.").
345. See id. at 615 (finding that government's arguments in support of Violence
Against Women Act would impermissibly justify federal regulation over "family law
and other areas of traditional state regulation"); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (noting that
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In addition, the congressional findings regarding the constitutional
authority for these amendments, which simply state that, "Congress
further finds that the employment of persons in domestic service in
households affects commerce, '346  are dangerously scant and
conclusory for this Court.347 Ultimately, the amendments would likely
survive a Commerce Clause challenge particularly because the
conduct that the Act is meant to regulate-the non-payment of
wages-can be characterized, even in the Court's elusive calculus, as
essentially "commercial.
341
Nevertheless, the persistence of potential federalism objections beg
a deeper question: why should human and civil rights protections
solely derive from a connection, substantial or otherwise, to mere
"commerce among the states"-a connection that has been doctrinally
restricted by vacillating conceptions of state autonomy and definitions
of "commerce" and that has a less than obvious historical link to the
purposes of the commerce clause.349 Instead, human and civil rights
protections should also emanate from an obvious and constructive
source-the Reconstruction Amendments, particularly the Thirteenth
Amendment, which unambiguously reaches private conduct. From a
doctrinal perspective, arguments about extending civil and human
rights protections grounded in the Reconstruction Amendments,
which rendered a revolutionary constitutional reordering of federal-
state relations in the domain of civil rights,35° are not susceptible to
federalism-based objections.
From a conceptual perspective, commerce and human rights are
mismatched; their connection is strained and artificial. The commerce
power exists to advance the instrumental goals of national unity,
economic progress, and interstate commercial harmony. In obvious
government's arguments in support of Gun Free School Zones Act would
impermissibly justify federal regulation of "family law" (including marriage, divorce,
and child custody)).
346. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). Presumably recognizing the aggregation principle of
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), Congress also found that, in 1974, over
1,285,000 workers were engaged in domestic employment. See H.R. statement of Rep.
No. 93-913 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2811, 2842.
347. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 ("Congressional findings would enable us to
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce ....").
348. See Khalifa v. Huda, No. 99-5593, slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. filed Dec. 29, 2000)
("While the impact of the employment of domestic servants on interstate commerce is
indirect, the court finds that it is not as indirect as those matters which the Supreme
Court has identified as beyond Congress's commerce powers, such as domestic
violence or weapons possession near a school.").
349. See Pope, supra note 1, at 6 ("[H]uman rights statutes are ... misclassified as
exercises of the commerce power .... ).
350. See supra text accompanying notes 225-38.
351. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 11 (1824) (explaining that the
great objects of the commerce clause were to place commerce "under the protection
of a uniform law" and prevent "a perpetual jarring and hostility of commercial
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contrast, the Reconstruction Amendments aim to advance abstract
but fundamental moral values of equality, freedom and human
dignity.352 Vindicating civil or human rights in Congress or in court
should express or advance a corresponding constitutional norm; in the
case of modern slavery, this is not the norm of broad commercial or
anti-protectionist regulatory powers embodied by Article I, Section 8,
but those of equality and freedom embodied in the Thirteenth
Amendment.
Surprisingly, relatively little scholarly attention has been devoted to
the project of divorcing civil rights remedies from authority under the
commerce clause. "I Constitutional lawyers, by contrast, have
previously exhorted lawmakers to develop a natural linkage between
rights and remedies. In the 1920s and 1930s, labor activists had
developed a full theory of Thirteenth Amendment protections of
labor rights, which included the right to organize, strike and bargain
collectively.354  Labor leaders became critical of attempts by
regulation" among the states); id. at 224 (Johnson, J., concurring) (explaining that
Commerce Clause was an attempt to end "iniquitous laws and impolitic measures,
from which grew up a conflict of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony
of the States and fatal to their commercial interests").
352. See supra text accompanying notes 159-67; see also Nelson, supra note 156, at
9 (explaining that proponents of Fourteenth Amendment "used equality and rights
principles exactly as they had used them before the Civil War: to articulate a moral
posture and, by enacting their morality into law, to encourage others to abide by it");
Forbath, Caste, Class, supra note 334, at 26.
353. Some scholars have suggested alternative sources of constitutional authority,
but have not gone the additional step to argue that these alternative sources are
conceptually superior. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the
Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck
Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 109 (2000) (arguing that the
Court's decision in Morrison undervalued the concurrent federal interest in national
civil rights protections); Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, A Thirteenth Amendment
Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1097, 1100 (1998)
(suggesting that the Thirteenth Amendment could provide constitutional support for
the VAWA); Melinda M. Renshaw, Choosing Between Principles of Federal Power:
The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 47 Emory L.J. 819, 821
(1998) (suggesting that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would authorize
VAWA).
354. See Pope, supra note 1, at 14-18. The labor movement had, over previous
years, modest success in courts advancing these theories. See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 65 (1.927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stating that an injunction against a sympathy strike "reminds [one] of
involuntary servitude"); Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912, 937 (8th Cir. 1897)
(declaring that denial of right to strike amounted to unconstitutional wage slavery);
Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1894) (Harlan, Circuit Justice)
(overturning part of anti-strike injunction in part because workers enjoyed Thirteenth
Amendment right to "confer with each other upon the subject of the proposed
reduction in wages"); Kemp v. Div. No. 241 Amalgamated Ass'n of St. & Elec. Ry.
Employees of Am., 99 N.E. 389, 392 (Il. 1912) (overturning, partly on Thirteenth
Amendment basis, an injunction prohibiting union from calling a strike); see also
Local 232, U.A.W.A. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 251
(1949); U.S. v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845, 849 (N.D. Il1. 1946) ("Under the Thirteenth
Amendment the right of any worker to leave his employment at will or for no reason
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progressive lawyers in the Roosevelt administration to ground labor
protections in various New Deal statutes such as the NIRA, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the Wagner Act in the commerce power,
rather than the Thirteenth Amendment. Specifically, they regarded
the attempt to describe labor with the constitutional vocabulary of
commerce as disjointed, unnatural, dishonest. 5 or, in the words of
Samuel Gompers, as "an outrage upon our language. 3 56 In the labor
rights orientation, labor inhered to an individual and could not be
stripped from a worker as if it were a commercial artifact:
We protest against the use of such definitions for the purpose of
bringing labor, employment and industrial relations under the power
granted to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and under
[the] guise of such definition place labor, the service of free men,
under the same restraints and limitations as well as under the same
classification as articles of trade to be bargained for in like principles
and practices as commodities of commerce.
357
During the flurry of legislative activity in the 1930s, labor activists
convinced Senator Norris to base an early version of the Norris-
LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act expressly on the Thirteenth
Amendment.3 The final version of the Act omitted any reference to
the Thirteenth Amendment, primarily, Professor Pope contends,
because of the considerable influence of Felix Frankfurter.359
Frankfurter had long dismissed the Amendment as insignificant and
uninterpretable perhaps as a result of the flattened out account of the
Amendment proffered by the Slaughter-House Cases.36" Frankfurter
claimed, without explanation and inconsistent with the enactors'
at all is protected and that right is inviolate."), rev'd on other grounds, 332 U.S. 1, 13
(1947) ("The Union contends that the statute ... violates the Thirteenth Amendment
in that it imposes a form of compulsory service or involuntary servitude.").
355. Pope, supra note 1, at 4.
356. Id. at 23.
357. Id. at 20 (quoting AFL, Report of Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Annual
Convention of the American Federation of Labor 194 (1929)); see also id. at 24 n.92
(citing 51 Cong. Rec. 9672 (1914) (statement of statement of Rep. Buchanan) (noting
a "difference between commodities and living human beings; in other words, that...
humanity was in a different class from a ton of coal, a bolt of cloth, or a pile of
bricks")); id. (quoting AFL, Report of Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual
Convention of the American Federation of Labor 311 (1926) (statement of Andrew
Furuseth) ("[H]uman labor.., grows with the growth of the child or boy or young
man, it lessens in sickness and it ceases at death ... and no one inherits it, no one can
buy it, no one can sell it without buying or selling the body in which that labor power
is.")).
358. In its statement of purpose, the bill included the idea that "every human being
has under the Thirteenth Amendment ... an inalienable right to the disposal of his
labor free from interference, restraint or coercion by or in behalf of employers of
labor." Id. at 39; see also id. at 41 n.190 (citing 75 Cong. Rec. 4502 (1932) (statement
of Senator Norris) (arguing that labor injunctions constituted "involuntary servitude
on the part of those who must toil in order that they and their families may live")).
359. Id. at 38-46.
360. See supra Part ILA.
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Thirteenth Amendment vision, that the prospect of using the
Thirteenth Amendment in support of the anti-injunction provisions of
the Norris bill "seems to me of a simplicity that borders on the
fantastic," and that "the talk about the Thirteenth Amendment... is
too silly for any practical lawyer's use.
'
"
361
Government lawyers thus passed on an opportunity to present to
the Supreme Court a modern, robust conception of the Thirteenth
Amendment's protection of labor and dignity. Instead, in what
Professor Pope calls "one of the great curiosities of American law,"
the progressive lawyers charged with "defend[ing] the
constitutionality of [New Deal labor reform], downplayed or
eschewed altogether the language of rights and freedoms. Instead,
they dressed the statutes in the language of economics so that they
could be justified as exercises of the commerce power." '362
During the debates over the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Professor
Gerald Gunther also noted the unfortunate mismatch created by
grounding the authority for the Act in the Commerce Clause rather
than the Reconstruction Amendments. Doing so, he argued in
congressional testimony, would obscure the Act's obviously moral
force in an "artificial commercial faqade," and it would be wiser for
Congress to "channel its resources of ingenuity and advocacy into the
development of a viable interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the provision with a natural linkage to the race
problem." '363 Although congressmen echoed his concerns,364 the Act
was passed pursuant to the congressional commerce power.365
As a result of the efforts of the Roosevelt and Johnson
administrations, many of the human and civil rights protections of the
361. Pope, supra note 1, at 40.
362. Id. at 5.
363. Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 149 (12th ed. 2001).
364. In response to Professor Gunther's testimony on the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
a Rhode Island Senator Pastore explained:
[I] believe in this bill because I believe in the dignity of man, not because it
impedes our [commerce].... But I like to feel that what we are talking
about is a moral issue. [And] that morality, it seems to me, comes under the
14th Amendment, where [we] speak about equal protection of the law. [I]
am saying that we are being a little too careful, cagey, and cautious.
Id. at 1.50-51 (alterations in original). Supreme Court justices have also noted the
conceptual divergence of rights and commerce. Criticizing the Court's decision to
base the constitutional right to interstate travel on the commerce clause, Justice
Douglas argued that human movement "occupies a more protected position in our
constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal,"
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring), and Justice
Jackson explained that to gauge human rights by commerce power would likely
"result eventually either in distorting the commercial law or denaturing human
rights." Id. at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring).
365. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (concluding
"the adoption of the Act... is within the power granted [to Congress] by the
Commerce Clause").
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last sixty years have curiously, unnaturally, and even dishonestly
employed fictional conceptions of commerce to justify their creation.
By contrast, the Thirteenth Amendment provides a rich vocabulary of
freedom, equality and human dignity. It supports a natural
connection between constitutional authority and civil rights
protections. The Amendment should be revived to solve the problem
of modern slavery and to help reconstruct a broad, firm civil rights
agenda.
B. The Need for an Expressive Thirteenth Amendment Remedy
Recent scholarship has emphasized that the expressive value of law,
as distinguished from its utilitarian or instrumental value, is and
should be of primary concern to courts and litigants.366 Expressive
harms are social, not individual; they convey a social meaning
independent of material consequences that can and should be
measured against some collective moral consensus or constitutional
norm.367 The expressivist argues that law conveys social meaning-
that appearances matter.368 By corollary, the choice of legal remedies
and the corresponding collective sanction of the behavior at issue
communicates social norms as much as do legislative or executive
conduct. Expressive legal remedies therefore are important because
"they express recognition of injury and reaffirmation of the
underlying normative principles for how the relevant [social]
relationships are to be constituted." '369 The expressive value of the
FLSA and other state common-law remedies are simply a mismatch
for the individual harm suffered by the victims of slavery and
involuntary servitude or for the collective, social harm inflicted by its
perpetrators.
The social relationship at issue in modern slavery cases involves
more than merely unequal bargaining power of the kind contemplated
366. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:
A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, An
Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Or. L. Rev. 339 (2000); Richard H. Pildes,
Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27 J. Legal Stud. 725 (1998) [hereinafter Pildes, Why Rights Are
Not Trumps]. Professors Pildes & Niemi demonstrate that courts, in evaluating
government conduct, are concerned with "expressive harms" (such as the harmful
message sent by the North Carolina legislature when it designed a "bizarre" voting
district which resulted in a political identity that is predominantly associated with
race) communicated by the challenged state action. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts" and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 483, 494 (1993).
367. See Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 366, at 755.
368. Cf. David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage": The First Amendment and
Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 925 (2001) (arguing that
symbolic importance of "marriage" label is essential to concept's social value and as
such, institution should be available to same sex couples as a First Amendment right).
369. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 366, at 1529.
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by the FLSA's remedial scheme. The relationship cannot colorably be
characterized as a bargain; it involves total control-physical,
psychological and economic-by one private person over another.
Professor Tushnet marked an important distinction between a market
relationship of the kind the FLSA presumes and the quality of total
dominion that is exercised over a slave:
Social relations in slave society rest upon the interaction of owner
with slave; the owner, having total dominion over the slave, relates
to the entire personality of the slave. In contrast, bourgeois social
relations rest upon the paradigmatic instance of market relations,
the purchase by a capitalist worker's labor power.... Slave social
relations are total, engaging the master and slave in exchanges
where each must take account of the entire range of belief, feeling,
and interest embodied in the other; bourgeois social relations are
partial, requiring only that participants in the market evaluate their
general productive characteristics without regard to aspects of
personality unrelated to production.371
A remedy must express meaningful reprobation of undesired
conduct, which "requires not [just] a mere utterance,.., but a practice
of punishment socially understood to express condemnation
effectively. '37' The harm committed-coercing another human in
violation of our basic constitutional commitment-must be expressed
in no less a damning form than by constitutional pronouncement.
Indeed, a perverse effect of relying on the FLSA as a remedy for
modern slavery is that it actually legitimizes a relationship ex ante that
is unconstitutional pursuant to Thirteenth Amendment by classifying
plaintiff and defendant as "employer" and "employee."
In addition, the adequacy of a particular legal remedy should be
evaluated not merely by its remunerative promise, but also by how
well it illustrates the moral and constitutional norms at issue. For
example, by awarding nominal damages for violations of
constitutional rights even absent proof of actual injury, "the law
recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be
scrupulously observed. '372 Viewed this way, the FLSA or other state
370. Tushnet, supra note 75, at 6; see State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (N.C.
1829) ("Such obedience [of a slave to a master] is the consequence only of
uncontrolled authority over the body .... The power of the master must be absolute,
to render the submission of the slave perfect."); McConnell, supra note 76, at 219
("[T]he system of American slavery is best understood as the absolute control by
white slaveholders over all aspects of the lives of their slaves."); see also David Brion
Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture 57-58 (1966) ("[Slaves] have been
subject to the will and autonomy of a private or institutional owner; their labor and
services have been totally at the disposal of others.").
371. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 366, at 1567; see also James Q. Whitman, What
Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 Yale L.J. 1055 (1998).
372. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). State contract law and the majority
of state tort law, by contrast, requires actual injury as an element of the substantive
cause of action.
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law causes of action can hardly be considered as an appropriate
remedy for the conduct at issue in modern slavery cases, even if they
provide precisely the same material reward.
The expressive model is helpful in another obvious respect. It is
concerned with expressive harms communicated by government
actors, inconsistent with a constitutional norm. The relevant
constitutional actors at issue in modern slavery cases are private
individuals. By enslaving another human, a private actor
communicates a message that is not merely inconsistent with state law
or federal economic policy, but rather, with basic normative
commitment of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Moreover, treating the harm done in these cases as of constitutional
and moral dimension will do more than vindicate the individual right
of the victim. It will vindicate the collective rights of a society that
fundamentally condemns the relationship at issue. "[R]ights also
realize the interests of others, including the construction of a political
culture with a specific kind of character." '373 This understanding is
deeply consonant with that of the Thirteenth Amendment ratifiers,
who regarded slavery not just as inhumanity perpetrated upon
individual African Americans, but also as a collective, social harm
resulting from exploiting human labor.374
C. Direct Actions Under the Thirteenth Amendment: Developing
Positive Rights
Congress certainly has the authority under the broad grant of power
under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment to create a civil
remedy for slavery that adequately effectuates and expresses the
Amendment's purposes.375 Should Congress decide to address the
problem of modern slavery and involuntary servitude through the
creation of a new civil remedy or by amending 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),376
a judicially created remedy would not be necessary. As the first court
in the country finally acknowledged, the existence of some adequate
remedy for Thirteenth Amendment violations is required.377 Even
373. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps, supra note 366, at 731. "[T]he weight and
importance of [a] right depends on its value to those others, and not on the benefit
that this in turn secures to the right-holder." Id. (quoting Joseph Raz).
374. See infra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
375. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) ("Congress has the
power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges
and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into
effective legislation."); Tribe, supra note 340, at 927 (suggesting that "Congress is
free, within the broad limits of reason, to recognize whatever rights it wishes, define
the infringement of those rights as a form of domination or subordination and thus an
aspect of slavery, and proscribe such infringement as a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment").
376. See supra text accompanying notes 305-22.
377. Manliguez v. Joseph, No. 01-CV-7574, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *13-15
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2002) (creating a civil cause of action for involuntary servitude
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this court, however, misread a critical feature of the Thirteenth
Amendment, demonstrating that the jurisprudence surrounding this
otherwise promising enactment remains underdeveloped.
Federal courts have long had the power to create equitable
remedies for direct constitutional violations3 78 that have assumed
structurally significant and certainly controversial forms.379 In the
1971 ruling in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,38° the Supreme
Court likewise decided that a direct damages remedy was available for
constitutional violations in the absence of congressional authorization
and where some state tort remedy was available but not adequate.
Although some ambivalence has since surfaced regarding the Bivens
enterprise, the court's power to create remedies where Congress has
not provided them still exists.381 In exercising the power to remedy
violations of Thirteenth Amendment rights, courts would simply be
fulfilling their central function of vindicating and elaborating
constitutional values as well as performing a crucial adjudicative
function announced in Marbury v. Madison to provide a remedy for
violations of citizens' rights.382
1. Bivens Remedies for Thirteenth Amendment Violations
Mr. Bivens alleged that FBI agents stormed his house in the middle
of the night, manacled him in front of his family then took him to the
federal courthouse, interrogated and strip searched him, all without
probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.383 Because he
was never brought to trial, excluding the unconstitutionally obtained
evidence was not an available remedy; because the agents were not
state officials, they could not be sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
Bivens was thus the rare victim of a Fourth Amendment violation
and was left with no remedy other than a state law tort action for
trespass which, in New York, would provide only actual damages and
fail to compensate him for his alleged stress and humiliation.3 4 The
Second Circuit conceded the theoretical possibility of inferring
based on the criminal involuntary servitude statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2000)).
378. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
379. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-66 (1966) (requiring recitation
of warnings for custodial arrests to protect Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (adopting exclusionary rule for
violations of Fourth Amendment).
380. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
381. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (reaffirming that the
court's authority to imply new constitutional tort not expressly authorized by statute
is grounded in general jurisdictional provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1331(a)).
382. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803).
383. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
384. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1535 (1972).
1050 [Vol. 71
MODERN SLAVERY
damage remedies directly from the constitution, but concluded that a
judicially created damage action is not essential to the effectuation of
the Fourth Amendment, particularly since injunctive relief, state tort
remedies and congressionally authorized actions against state officers
would be available in the vast majority of cases.385
The Supreme Court reversed. The Brennan majority opinion first
rejected the officers' argument that the Fourth Amendment confers
no substantive rights independent of state law and that it was meant
only to foreclose a federal defense of justification in state tort actions.
Rather, the Court concluded, the Fourth Amendment confers an
independent, substantive and affirmative right.386 The existence of
that affirmative right bars all government officials from abusing it and
empowers courts to vindicate it.387
The Court next assessed whether courts possess the power to create
causes of action directly under the Constitution38 s or if, as several
dissenters argued, such power rested only with the legislature.389 In
his oft-cited concurrence, Justice Harlan correctly responded that if
the general congressional grant of federal question jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1331(a) authorizes equitable remedies for
cases arising under the Constitution, then "the same statute is
sufficient to empower a federal court to grant a traditional remedy at
law.""39 " Similarly, the question of whether to grant a damage remedy
rather than an equitable remedy is not related to the established
power of federal courts; it turns only on the appropriateness of that
choice.3"1 Exercising the choice to award damages for violations of
385. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
409 F.2d 718, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1969).
386. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392.
387. Id. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)); id. at 400 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe interest which Bivens claims-to be free from official conduct in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment-is a federally protected interest.").
388. Id. at 401-02 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]he question is whether the power to
authorize damages as a judicial remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional
right is placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in Congress' hands.").
389. See id. at 412 (Burger, J., dissenting) ("Legislation is the business of the
Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task-as we do not."); id. at
430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[l]t is the Congress and not this Court that should
act.").
390. Id. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Dellinger, supra note 384, at 1541-
42 ("The Court's authority to create a particular remedy in such a case thus follows if
the remedial innovation sought is within the ... tightly packed phrase [from Article
III] 'the judicial power,' for it is that power which extends to all cases arising under
the Constitution."); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing
Constitution, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 289, 300 (1995) ("[G]iven the existence of 28 U.S.C. §
1331, conferring general federal question jurisdiction, the jurisdictional predicate for
Bivens actions does exist.").
391. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 408 n.8 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("[A] court of law vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
suit has the power-and therefore the duty-to make principled choices among
traditional judicial remedies."); Dellinger, supra note 384, at 1543 ("[N]either the
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substantive constitutional rights "should hardly seem a surprising
proposition. 39 2  Though the Court provides little analysis for its
conclusion that damages have historically "been regarded as the
ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty," '393 its
conclusion is certainly correct. Indeed, damages are the presumptive
common law remedy for litigants; courts are to impose equitable
remedies only where there is no remedy available at law.394
In Bivens, the court thus determined that: (i) a violation of a
substantive constitutional provision occurred; (ii) there is a legal
entitlement or cause of action for relief for that violation directly from
a court in the absence of congressional authorization; and (iii)
damages are an appropriate remedy to vindicate the Fourth
Amendment harms suffered. Importantly, in reversing the Second
Circuit, the Supreme Court recognized that the availability of other
remedies for most other plaintiffs is not sufficient to refuse to
recognize a cause of action for the litigant before the court. In
addition, the Court recognized that a New York state law action for
trespass, while affording some monetary damages, was not
constitutionally adequate.395 A court's central constitutional concern
should be whether the particular plaintiff before the court has an
adequate remedy available to vindicate the constitutional provision at
issue.396
source of the right (the Constitution) nor the nature of the (rather customary) remedy
(money damages) would seem to require that the judiciary await explicit legislative
authorization before employing the remedy to vindicate the right.").
392. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395.
393. Id. Justice Harlan simply concludes that damages are one of an available
battery of remedies from which judges can choose to "make good the wrong done,"
and that if courts can effectuate statutory rights by imposing damage remedies, they
can do the same for constitutional rights. Id. at 408 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring). He
also notes that the character of the claim Bivens advanced is of the kind that "would
be properly compensable in damages." Id. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring).
394. See Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75
Va. L. Rev. 1117, 1135 (1989) (arguing that hesitancy to award damages for
constitutional violations is misplaced in light of the historical preference for damages
over equitable remedies at common law).
395. See infra text accompanying notes 320, 396-409; see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 122 S. Ct. 515, 525-26. (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In Bivens, however,
even though the plaintiff's suit against the Federal Government under state tort law
may have been barred by sovereign immunity, a suit against the officer himself under
state tort law was theoretically possible.").
396. See Dellinger, supra note 384, at 1551.
As a prerequisite to supplying a remedy, the court must first determine that
the implicated constitutional provision provides substantive protection to
one in the position of the plaintiff .... [T]he fact that persons in other
situations may have access to remedies that will vindicate their rights under
the constitutional provision in question should not preclude the judicial
creation of remedies for a particular plaintiff who is without effective means
of redress.
Id.; see Bandes, supra note 390, at 304 ("Bivens stands for the proposition that the
existence of remedies for others is beside the point: The particular plaintiff before the
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Bivens thus supplies strong authority for the availability of a cause
of action for damages directly under the Thirteenth Amendment even
in the absence of congressional authorization. The Thirteenth
Amendment, like the Fourth Amendment, creates a substantive
federal right. At the core, that right includes freedom from conditions
of coerced labor.397 The right also most definitely exists independent
of state common law. The Amendment and its enforcing legislation
deliberately supplanted state laws and designated federal courts as the
primary enforcement mechanism for the vindication of rights
promulgated by Thirteenth Amendment civil rights legislation.398
Damages are likewise often the only remedy available to vindicate
the constitutional interests of victims of slavery and involuntary
servitude. The state law tort of false imprisonment and the civil
damage remedy under the Fair Labor Standards Act simply do not
vindicate constitutional interests, even if they target some of the
incidental effects or component aspects of modern slavery or
involuntary servitude.399 Similarly, the statutory remedies under §
1985(3) will not help most victims of modern slavery who would not
be able to demonstrate the requisite class-based animus on the part of
the defendants.4 "" Thus, the need for a damage remedy is just as
strong for victims of Thirteenth Amendment violations as it was for
Bivens.
Indeed, a constitutional tort for slavery or involuntary servitude is
even more properly remediable through damages than a Fourth
Amendment violation. As Professor Jeffries explains, some
constitutional duties are like ordinary tort duties.4"' To the extent that
damages incentivize behavior, a premise in tort doctrine, violations of
Thirteenth Amendment rights should be compensable because the
wrong-enslavement-is directly related to injuries that causally flow
from it. Some constitutional duties, such as the prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures and protection of free speech are
"prophylactic" and "strategic," and so it is hard to match individual
harm to constitutional wrong." 2  The Thirteenth Amendment, by
contrast, is like the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on takings without
just compensation. Because they both guard "individuals against
specified harms by directly prohibiting the infliction of such harms,"
violations of these provisions are likely to create the exact damage the
provision is designed to award.4"3 Thus, violations of the Thirteenth
court is entitled to adequate relief.").
397. See supra Part II.C.
398. Id.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 306-14.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 313-18.
401. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of
Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1461, 1466-67 (1989).
402. Id. at 1471-72.
403. Id. at 1470.
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Amendment work well in the narrow doctrinal sense as a
constitutional tort.
Moreover, the availability of such a remedy demonstrates the
inexorable logic of Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivens about the
power of courts equally to issue equitable or legal relief."4 If someone
currently held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude were
to sue, that person would assuredly be able to obtain the equitable
remedy of an injunction releasing her from servitude.4 5 Accordingly,
a court would have the equal power to choose a damage remedy for
the same victim suing retrospectively for compensation.
Creating a remedy in these cases would also acknowledge the
importance of the otherwise unvindicated underlying Thirteenth
Amendment right. The recognition of these rights serves an
important social function by demonstrating that the government is
committed to eradicating a problem that so severely undermines
collective norms." 6 As the Court explained in Davis v. Passman,407
which recognized a Bivens action for violations of the Fifth
Amendment:
[W]e presume that justiciable constitutional rights are to be
enforced through the courts. And, unless such rights are to become
merely precatory, the class of those litigants who allege that their
own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same
time have no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce
these rights, must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the
courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.4" 8
Recognizing such a right would also validate the humanity of
individual victims and would help transform them from a
commodified labor resource into three-dimensional persons deserving
of equal dignity and respect.4 °9
404. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 405-06 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
405. See, e.g., In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
(ordering release of black child apprentice retained by owner in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1866).
406. Seesupra Part III.B.
407. 442 U.S. 228 (1979)
408. Id. at 242.
409. See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 Hastings L.J. 665, 679 (1987) (tracing
the evolution of the principle that rights must have remedies, and arguing that failure
to enforce underlying rights causes "[tlhe dignity of the individual [to be] diminished
and people [to be] less able to achieve their goals"). "People feel insecure and they
lose self-respect. If the legal system tells a person that it is acceptable for his rights to
be violated, the implicit message is that the person lacks worth." Id.
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2. The Irrelevance of the Ambivalence About Bivens
In the decade following Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized the
existence of direct causes of action for violations of the First,41 0 Fifth4 1
and Eighth Amendments,412 and lower courts have recognized Bivens
actions for various constitutional violations as well.4"3 In more recent
years, the Supreme Court has expanded upon the two narrow
circumstances, set forth in Bivens, where courts should decline to
create direct causes of action for constitutional violations: where there
are "special factors" counseling hesitation in the absence of
congressional authorization; or where there is a congressional
declaration that persons injured may not recover damages for the
particular constitutional harm suffered. 4
The Court has, therefore, revealed a deep but ultimately
unwarranted ambivalence about the Bivens enterprise out of a
reluctance to interfere with the "legislative sphere. 4 5 In addition, the
410. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (accepting the general existence of Bivens
remedies for First Amendment violations but refusing to create one in particular case
because Congress had created adequate alternative remedies).
411. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 234 (expanding Bivens action to a suit under the Fifth
Amendment brought by congressman's aide for discriminatory termination).
412. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (recognizing Bivens action under Eighth
Amendment for prisoner's allegations of inadequate medical treatment, despite
existence of available remedy under Federal Tort Claims Act).
413. See Wells v. FAA, 755 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1985) (recognizing the potential for
Bivens action under the Fourth Amendment); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (expanding Bivens action to the First Amendment); Wounded Knee Legal
Def./Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (expanding Bivens
actions to the Sixth Amendment); Kwoun v. Southeast Mo. Prof'l Standards Review
Org., 622 F. Supp. 520 (D. Mo. 1985) (recognizing Bivens action for Fifth Amendment
violation).
414. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 380, 396-97 (1971). The
Court has blurred the two distinct exceptions to Bivens actions by finding that the
existence of congressional remedies is itself a "special factor" counseling judicial
hesitation, rather than evaluating the congressional remedy on its own terms to assess
its adequacy in effectuating the constitutional right at issue. See Schweiker v. Chilicky,
487 U.S. 412 (1988) (refusing to create Bivens remedy for Fifth Amendment due
process violations in light of a broad regulatory social security scheme, which
nevertheless failed to address harms at issue); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669
(1987) (declining to create a Bivens remedy under the Eighth Amendment, even
where plaintiff would be left with no adequate remedy, in part because Congress had
specifically excluded the particular class of victims-military personnel-from its
statutory provisions); Bush, 462 U.S. at 368 (holding that the existence of alternate
remedies under the federal Civil Service Commission regulations precluded Bivens
suit under First Amendment, without assessing if regulations would make an equally
effective remedy); see also Bandes, supra note 390, at 360-61 (criticizing Court's
deference to congressionally created remedial schemes without assessing their
adequacy in cases such as Bush v. Lucas, Schweiker v. Chilicky, and United States v.
Stanley).
415. See Nichol, supra note 394, at 1142-43; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1508-09 (1987) [hereinafter Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism] (noting that judicial reluctance about Bivens "probably
stems from a lingering doubt about whether remedy-fashioning is a more legislative
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only two courts, to conclude that there can be no Thirteenth
Amendment Bivens actions against private actors4"6 reveal an
unsurprising unfamiliarity with the scope and operation of the
Thirteenth Amendment, which unambiguously reaches private
conduct.
a. Separation of Powers
Objectors to Bivens actions often argue that judicially created
constitutional remedies wrongfully usurp the "legislative sphere, 4 17 or
that legislatures are far more competent than courts to sift and
evaluate competing constitutional claims."' Both of these objections
make little sense, however, when one considers that judges in Bivens
actions are fulfilling their narrowest adjudicative function by merely
attempting to "make good the wrong done" to an individual plaintiff
in a single case or controversy brought before the court. In such
actions, the court is fulfilling its most basic duty to "say what the law
is" '419 and actually protecting the constitutional scheme of separation
of powers. Indeed judges are traditionally superior at fashioning
remedies for violations of substantive rights brought before the court.
Thus, far from impinging on the so-called legislative domain,
providing an individual remedy for an individual wrong is performing
a quintessentially judicial function,42 and will advance one of the
highest adjudicative principles announced in Marbury v. Madison:
"the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury." '421
More important, however, arguments about the legislative role or
superior legislative competence to fashion remedies for constitutional
wrongs are beside the point. Congress certainly has the power under
than judicial function, and from an awareness of the special political vulnerability of
federal judges in suits involving coercive relief against agents in coordinate branches
of government," and arguing that Bivens actions actually strengthen the system of
separation of powers).
416. Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 374 (D.R.I. 1978) (holding
Bivens action was neither "necessary" nor "appropriate" for vindication of Thirteenth
Amendment rights at issue); Manliguez v. Joseph, No. 01-CV-7574, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15277, at *12 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2002) (concluding that Bivens only
applies against government, not private, actors). But see Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d
214, 217 (5th Cir. 1997) (assuming arguendo, "that the Thirteenth Amendment
directly gives rise to a cause of action for damages under the analysis articulated in
[Bivens] and its progeny.").
417. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 34 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
418. See, e.g., id. at 36; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 428-29 (Black, J., dissenting).
419. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
420. See Bandes, supra note 390, at 304; Nichol, supra note 394, at 1147-48.
421. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163; see also Amar, Sovereignty and Federalism, supra
note 415, at 1.486 ("The proposition that every person should have a judicial remedy
for every legal injury done him was a common provision in the bill of rights of state
constitutions; [and] was invoked by The Federalist No. 43 in a passage whose very
casualness indicated its uncontroversial quality .... ").
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the broad grant of power under section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment to create an adequate remedy for slavery that effectuates
the Amendment's purposes.422 Therefore, unless and until Congress
chooses to provide one, the debate about relative institutional
competence will continue to be academic. Victims of slavery and
involuntary servitude will go without adequate constitutional
remedies and important Thirteenth Amendment values will remain
unvindicated.
b. Private Actors
The only two cases, Turner v. Unification Church4 23 and Manliguez
v. Joseph,42 4 to directly confront the possibility of a Bivens action for
Thirteenth Amendment violations raise an additional concern about
extending the Bivens doctrine to private actors;42 those concerns are
misplaced. In Turner, the court concluded that damages for a plaintiff
who alleged she was brainwashed, enslaved and forced to work by
Reverend Moon's Unification Church were neither "necessary" nor
"appropriate" under the Thirteenth Amendment.426 In Manliguez, the
422. See supra text accompanying notes 136-47.
423. 473 F. Supp. 367, 374 (D.R.I. 1978).
424. No. 01-CV-7574, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15,
2002).
425. In Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit rejected
the argument that only Congress can provide remedies for violations of the
Thirteenth Amendment and assumed arguendo, without analysis "that the Thirteenth
Amendment directly gives rise to a cause of action for damages under the analysis
articulated in [Bivens] and its progeny" for cases involving compulsory labor. Several
other courts have concluded that no direct cause of action exists under section 1, and
that plaintiffs must resort to remedies created by Congress. The analyses in these
decisions, however, are so cursory that it is difficult to determine if courts are
concerned about the implications of creating a Bivens-type remedy, or if courts have
concluded that the conduct at issue could not rise to the level of involuntary servitude.
See, e.g., Bascomb v. Smith Barney, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 353, at *18 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 15, 1999) (holding in an employment discrimination case that, "[i]t is well-settled
law that there is no direct private cause of action under the Thirteenth Amendment")
rev'd on other grounds, Lauture v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 216 F.3d 258 (2d Cir.
2000); Sanders v. A.J. Canfield Co., 635 F. Supp. 85, 87 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding, in an
employment discrimination case, that "[t]here is no direct private cause of action
under the Thirteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs, instead, must resort to statutory
remedies created by Congress under the power granted to it by that amendment");
Westray v. Porthole, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 834, 839 (D. Md. 1984) (holding that no direct
cause of action exists under Thirteenth Amendment and concluding that Bivens and
its progeny "arose out of different considerations"); Vietnamese Fishermen's Assoc.
v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1012 (S.D. Tex. 1981). Other cases
expressly hold that there is no cause of action under the Thirteenth Amendment in
the specific context of employment discrimination. See Matthews v. Freedman, 128
F.R.D. 194, 201 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that "[clourts across the country have
uniformly rejected the existence of a Thirteenth Amendment cause of action in the
context of employment discrimination" and imposing Rule 11 sanctions), affd 919
F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1990).
426. Turner, 473 F. Supp. at 374.
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court also declined to create a Bivens remedy for a plaintiff clearly
alleging facts sufficient to make out a case of involuntary servitude;42 7
instead, the court implied a civil cause of action from the criminal
involuntary servitude statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1584,428 an approach I
endorse.429
Both cases agree that courts have the power to imply constitutional
damage remedies, 4311 but both suggest that a Bivens remedy should not
be created for Thirteenth Amendment violations because the
defendants are private actors. Turner simply concludes, without
explanation, that Bivens only applies to government actors.431 This is
a manifestly illegitimate distinction since the relevant constitutional
actors under the Thirteenth Amendment are in most cases private
persons or entities. There is no less of a need to vindicate the
Thirteenth Amendment's interests than the Fourth Amendment's
interests or to reward a constitutionally aggrieved plaintiff a different
kind of remedy depending on the status of the defendant. Indeed, to
the extent that traditional objections to the creation of general
constitutional torts-overdeterrence of aggressive but legitimate
activity by government officials and inappropriate judicial
interference with legislative control over public funds432-do not apply
427. See supra text accompanying note 416.
428. Manliguez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *9-10. 18 U.S.C. § 1584, as
amended in 2000, provides,
Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into
any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or
brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the
violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt
to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated
sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.
429. Courts are empowered to create private rights of action from criminal statutes.
See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975). The primary inquiry in deciding whether to
create such a private right of action is congressional intent. See Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979). Congressional intent to create a private cause of
action under 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2000) would be hard to discern because the statute's
antecedent form was passed in 1874, during an era that bears little resemblance to our
modern administrative state. Nevertheless, creating a cause of action for damages
under the criminal involuntary servitude statute is certainly consistent with the
Reconstruction Congress's desire to root out involuntary servitude. In addition, the
victims of involuntary servitude are the same intended beneficiaries of the criminal
law. Moreover, the creation of such private rights of action would not interfere with
any area of law traditionally left to the states. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 84-85. Further,
such a remedy, because it is premised on the Thirteenth Amendment, would
adequately express the appropriate moral condemnation of the conduct at issue and
would vindicate the relevant constitutional interests of the Thirteenth Amendment
that are at stake.
430. See Turner, 473 F. Supp. at 367, 374; Manliguez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277,
at *13.
431. Turner, 473 F. Supp. at 374.
432. See John Jeffries, Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 Yale L.J. 259 (2000)
(discussing traditional overdeterrence and separation of powers objections to general
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to private defendants, the case for a Bivens remedy is made stronger
where the defendant is a private actor.433
Manliguez relied on the recent Supreme Court decision in
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,434 ("CSC") to suggest that the
"purpose of providing a cause of action under Bivens was to deter
federal officers from abusing their constitutional authority, not
necessarily to provide an individual with a remedy for the violation of
a constitutional right. ' 435 Manliguez misreads CSC and the Thirteenth
Amendment. In CSC, the Court refused to create a Bivens action
against a private corporation administering a federal prison for the
unconstitutional acts of its employee. 436  The basis of the Court's
refusal, however, was decidedly not the private status of the
defendant. The Court relied on FDIC v. Meyer,437 in which the Court
refused to create a Bivens action against a federal agency for
constitutional violations allegedly committed by the agency's
individual officials. In Meyer, like in CSC, the Court concluded that a
central purpose of Bivens-deterring unconstitutional conduct by "the
individual federal officer, not the agency"-would be undermined by
allowing plaintiffs to sue employers with deeper pockets.438
Therefore, in CSC the Court declined to create a cause of action
because the defendant was an employer rather than an individual, not
because the defendant was a private entity.439
Indeed, to the extent that CSC suggests that Bivens is primarily
concerned with deterring unconstitutional conduct most effectively,
constitutional torts).
433. The Turner court also concluded that creating a federal cause of action for
involuntary servitude would impermissibly "constitutionalize" the common law tort of
false imprisonment. Turner, 473 F. Supp. at 374. The court's conclusion is both wrong
and irrelevant. As previously demonstrated, false imprisonment would only remedy
an incidental effect of involuntary servitude and would otherwise leave plaintiffs to
the vagaries of differing tort law elements. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 393-94 (1971) (concluding that Fourth Amendment protections cannot
be "tied to the niceties" of state trespass laws). More fundamentally, a court granting
a Bivens remedy would not be "constitutionalizing" state torts; it would be rightly
remedying a constitutionally protected interest. The possible existence of a
concurrent state law remedy is utterly irrelevant to the availability of a federal right
from which citizens may claim protection. This is particularly true in the case of civil
rights interests, which exist independent of state law and are traditionally protected
by federal courts.
434. 122 S. Ct. 515 (2001).
435. Manliguez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277 at *12 n.7.
436. Corr. Servs. Corp., 122 S. Ct. at 521.
437. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
438. Corr. Servs. Corp., 122 S. Ct. at 521 ("For if a corporate defendant is available
for suit, claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual
directly responsible for the alleged injury."); see also Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485 ("It must
be remembered that the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.").
439. In fact, the Court specifically noted that the case did not present the question
of whether Bivens actions might lie against private individuals. Corr. Servs. Corp., 122
S. Ct. at 526 n.6.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the case lends support for the application of Bivens to Thirteenth
Amendment violations. In the vast majority of slavery or involuntary
servitude cases, the relevant constitutional actor whose illegal conduct
must be deterred is a private individual. To advance the goals of
remedying constitutional rights, vindicating a constitutional protection
and deterring unconstitutional conduct, Bivens applies equally to
Thirteenth Amendment prohibitions on private action as it does to
Fourth Amendment prohibitions on government conduct.
Manliguez and Turner fail to apprehend this fundamental
Thirteenth Amendment reality perhaps because, as the court itself
notes in Manliguez, involuntary servitude cases have been very rare in
this country.44  But, these cases are rare no.,more. Slavery or
involuntary servitude has reemerged and Manliguez and Turner
reflect the courts' uncertainty about how to deal with it. The
uncertainty is unsurprising to the extent that the Thirteenth
Amendment has been so little used or appreciated. In response to the
emergence of third generation slavery and its entailments, however,
courts will soon be presented with significant opportunities to
interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, to struggle with its meaning and
hopefully to reveal its applicability to modern slavery as well as the
substantial support it provides for a broad, firm civil rights agenda.
CONCLUSION
For too long, the Thirteenth Amendment has been regarded as a
simple statement of a narrow constitutional prohibition against chattel
slavery -a pronouncement too foundational to be either interpretable
or practical as a doctrinal tool for the protection of civil rights in the
modern era. Once the Amendment is unshackled from this pervading
and simplistic view, it emerges vital and open to substantive
interpretation. The debates surrounding its ratification reveal that the
Amendment, and the 1866 Civil Rights Act enacted upon its
authority, were meant to be a broad source of affirmative rights for all
Americans; to guarantee all persons, white and black, the equal
enjoyment of all fundamental rights; and to enshrine a vision of labor
freedom that would promote economic independence and social
mobility.
The scope and severity of the problem of modern slavery calls out
for a congruent remedy grounded in the Thirteenth Amendment's
broad egalitarian and distinctive libertarian promise. Such a remedy,
whether created by Congress or by the judiciary through a Bivens
action, would vindicate the strong federal interests advanced by the
Thirteenth Amendment and would express the appropriate moral
condemnation that the Amendment's prohibition on forced labor
requires.
440. Manliguez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15277, at *15.
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In addition, I hope that consideration of the compelling problem of
modern slavery against the background of a still-vital Thirteenth
Amendment will awaken courts, commentators and legislators to the
long-dormant interpretive possibilities that Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence holds. I hope that modern actors will appreciate the
moral passion that motivated its enactors, and recognize that this
passion undergirds a meaningful constitutional guarantee of freedom
and equality. We will then be in a position to recognize the
Amendment's special constitutional authority to reach private
conduct, and to support a broad, reconstructed civil rights agenda.
Notes & Observations
